Cited by

¶ 13 (App. 2013) (defendant “must affirmatively prove prejudice and may not rely upon speculation to carry his burden”) (cleaned up).

at 144, ¶ 31; ¶ 13 (App. 2013) (“Prejudice is a fact-intensive inquiry, the outcome of which will depend upon the type of error that occurred and the facts of a particular case.” (citation modified)); –50, ¶ 37 (App. 2016) (noting the defendant “bears the burden to show he was prejudiced” by

Relevant here, to prove prejudice, Arias must show that a reasonable jury “could have reached a different result.” ().

¶ 13 (App. 2013), as amended (Dec.

But the party asserting prejudice “‘must affirmatively prove prejudice’ and cannot merely ‘rely upon speculation.’” Brenda D., 243 Ariz. at 448 ¶ 38 ( ¶ 13 (App. 2013)).

could have reached a different [verdict].” 5 STATE v. FERRARA Decision of the Court Escalante, 245 Ariz. at 144, ¶ 29 ( ¶ 27 (2005)); ¶ 13 (App. 2013) (“[A defendant] must affirmatively ‘prove prejudice’ and may not rely upon ‘speculation’ to carry his burden [of establishing reversible fundamental error].”).

Olivas argues she was prejudiced because “the jurors were not properly instructed on the law.” ¶30 “To prove prejudice, [the defendant] must show that a reasonable, properly instructed jury ‘could have reached a different result.’” ¶ 13 (App. 2013) (citation omitted).

upon the type of error that occurred and the facts of a particular case.” ¶ 13 (App. 2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

To prove prejudice from a jury instruction, one must show that a “reasonable, properly instructed jury could have reached a different result.” ¶ 13 (App. 2013) (internal quotations omitted).

upon the type of error that occurred and the facts of a particular case.” ¶ 13 (App. 2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶ 13 (App. 2013) (explaining defendants must “affirmatively prove prejudice” on fundamental-error review).

To prevail on a fundamental-error claim, a defendant “may not rely upon ‘speculation’ to carry his burden.” ¶ 13 (App. 2013) (citation omitted).

“To prove prejudice, [Smith] must show that a reasonable, properly instructed jury ‘could have reached a different result.’” ¶ 13 (App. 2013) ( ¶ 15 (App. 2013)).

¶ 13 (App. 2013) (explaining defendants “must affirmatively prove prejudice and may not rely upon speculation to carry [their] burden” on fundamental-error review) (internal citation marks omitted).

¶ 13 (App. 2013) (stating that a defendant claiming fundamental error “must affirmatively ‘prove prejudice’ and may not rely upon ‘speculation’ to carry 8 STATE v. BAKER Decision of the Court his burden”); see also

This court considers the parties’ theories, the evidence received at trial, and the parties’ arguments to the jury to conclude whether the defendant has “affirmatively prove[n] prejudice” beyond mere “speculation.” ¶ 13 (App. 2013) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

¶ 12 (App. 2013) (relief from burden of proof); Escalante, 245 Ariz. at 143 ¶ 26 (direct effect on key factual dispute); Henderson, 210 Ariz. at 568 ¶ 25 (deprivation of constitutionally guaranteed procedure).

¶ 13 (App. 2013); ¶ 68 (2006) (“We presume that the jurors followed the court’s instructions.”).

¶ 10 6 STATE v. SHEPHARD Decision of the Court (App. 2013).

¶ 13 (App. 2013) (“[A defendant] must affirmatively ‘prove prejudice’ and may not rely upon ‘speculation’ to carry his burden [of establishing reversible fundamental error].”).