Cited by

at 144, ¶ 31; ¶ 13 (App. 2013) (“Prejudice is a fact-intensive inquiry, the outcome of which will depend upon the type of error that occurred and the facts of a particular case.” (citation modified)); –50, ¶ 37 (App. 2016) (noting the defendant “bears the burden to show he was prejudiced” by

Relevant here, to prove prejudice, Arias must show that a reasonable jury “could have reached a different result.” ().

¶ 13 (App. 2013), as amended (Dec.

But the party asserting prejudice “‘must affirmatively prove prejudice’ and cannot merely ‘rely upon speculation.’” Brenda D., 243 Ariz. at 448 ¶ 38 ( ¶ 13 (App. 2013)).

could have reached a different [verdict].” 5 STATE v. FERRARA Decision of the Court Escalante, 245 Ariz. at 144, ¶ 29 ( ¶ 27 (2005)); ¶ 13 (App. 2013) (“[A defendant] must affirmatively ‘prove prejudice’ and may not rely upon ‘speculation’ to carry his burden [of establishing reversible fundamental error].”).

Olivas argues she was prejudiced because “the jurors were not properly instructed on the law.” ¶30 “To prove prejudice, [the defendant] must show that a reasonable, properly instructed jury ‘could have reached a different result.’” ¶ 13 (App. 2013) (citation omitted).

upon the type of error that occurred and the facts of a particular case.” ¶ 13 (App. 2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

To prove prejudice from a jury instruction, one must show that a “reasonable, properly instructed jury could have reached a different result.” ¶ 13 (App. 2013) (internal quotations omitted).

upon the type of error that occurred and the facts of a particular case.” ¶ 13 (App. 2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶ 13 (App. 2013) (explaining defendants must “affirmatively prove prejudice” on fundamental-error review).

To prevail on a fundamental-error claim, a defendant “may not rely upon ‘speculation’ to carry his burden.” ¶ 13 (App. 2013) (citation omitted).

“To prove prejudice, [Smith] must show that a reasonable, properly instructed jury ‘could have reached a different result.’” ¶ 13 (App. 2013) ( ¶ 15 (App. 2013)).

¶ 13 (App. 2013) (explaining defendants “must affirmatively prove prejudice and may not rely upon speculation to carry [their] burden” on fundamental-error review) (internal citation marks omitted).

¶ 13 (App. 2013) (stating that a defendant claiming fundamental error “must affirmatively ‘prove prejudice’ and may not rely upon ‘speculation’ to carry 8 STATE v. BAKER Decision of the Court his burden”); see also

This court considers the parties’ theories, the evidence received at trial, and the parties’ arguments to the jury to conclude whether the defendant has “affirmatively prove[n] prejudice” beyond mere “speculation.” ¶ 13 (App. 2013) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

¶ 12 (App. 2013) (relief from burden of proof); Escalante, 245 Ariz. at 143 ¶ 26 (direct effect on key factual dispute); Henderson, 210 Ariz. at 568 ¶ 25 (deprivation of constitutionally guaranteed procedure).

¶ 13 (App. 2013); ¶ 68 (2006) (“We presume that the jurors followed the court’s instructions.”).

¶ 10 6 STATE v. SHEPHARD Decision of the Court (App. 2013).

¶ 13 (App. 2013) (“[A defendant] must affirmatively ‘prove prejudice’ and may not rely upon ‘speculation’ to carry his burden [of establishing reversible fundamental error].”).

Price argues the court’s instructions amounted to fundamental error and claims he suffered prejudice because the jury might have convicted him of attempted sexual assault for attempting “sexual contact,” rather than “oral sexual contact.” ¶11 Even assuming error, Price does not “prove prejudice” and instead relies on “speculation.” ¶ 13 (App. 2013) (quotation omitted).