Cited by

¶16 (App. 2003) (“[T]he trial judge possesses considerable latitude in determining whether good cause has been shown for late disclosure[.]”).

¶ 10 (App. 2003) (quoting Brown v. U.S. Fid.

¶ 16, (stating that the trial court possesses considerable latitude in determining whether a party has shown good cause for a late disclosure and concluding that when no good cause exists, “barring the introduction of evidence not previously disclosed may be a reasonable sanction”).

at 482–83, 720 P.2d at 83–84; ¶ 15, (stating the law of the case doctrine does not prevent a judge from reconsidering nonfinal rulings).

¶11 “The disclosure rules are designed to provide parties a reasonable opportunity to prepare for trial or settlement-nothing more, nothing less.” ¶ 13 (App. 2003) (quotation omitted).

Under Rule 7.1(b), if the non-moving party fails to respond to a motion, “such non-compliance may be deemed a consent to the denial or granting of the motion, and the court may dispose of the motion summarily.” The application of this Rule, however, “is not mandatory.” ¶ 21

DISCUSSION I. Motion in Limine ¶13 Melissa argues the trial court erred in denying her motion in limine to preclude evidence of the canine alert as a discovery sanction for the State’s failure to timely disclose certain details regarding the training and certification of the canine.3 ¶ 13 (App. 2003) (noting that a motion in limine to enforce disclosure rules “is effectively a request for sanctions under Rule 37(c)”).

¶ 15, (law of the case doctrine does not prevent different judge from reconsidering prior judge’s non-final rulings).

¶ 13, Absent material revisions after the relevant date, we cite the current version of a statute unless otherwise indicated.

Third, although the strength of Marquez’s case may have been diminished by the preclusion of expert testimony that was not timely and properly disclosed, the sanctions imposed did not have the effect of, ¶ 19 , “terminat[ing] the litigation.” Instead, the case proceeded to trial, where testimony was presented from two witnesses to the accident and an investigating police officer who testified regarding his observations of the accident scene.

See, -31, ¶¶ 13-14 , -73 (App.2008); ¶¶ 20-23

STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶ 9 “We will overturn the trial court’s rulings on the exclusion of evidence only for abuse of discretion or legal error and prejudice.” ¶ 10 , (internal quotation marks omitted).

-7 , -90 (1958) (party bound by settlement because she had authorized attorneys to settle .and settlement not “grossly unfair”); , (court should not dismiss case for discovery violation without first determining whether fault was attorney’s or party’s); Wayne Cook Enters., Inc. v. Fain Props.

See Lenze v. Synthes, Ltd., , (striking pleadings reviewed for abuse of discretion); ¶ 10 , (exclusion of evidence reviewed for abuse of discretion).

See, ¶ 21 , (holding trial court should not have granted motion in limine as a sanction for failure to make Rule 26.1 disclosures; sanction precluded all of plaintiffs trial evidence); , (exclusion of expert witness rendere

Moreover, upon remand, the doctrine of law of the case “does not prevent a judge from reconsidering non-final rulings, ‘[n]or does it prevent a different judge, sitting on the same ease, from reconsidering the first judge’s non-final rulings.’ ” [, ] (App.2003).

5 ¶9 McDougall stated that “a couple” of liquid spills occurred a week.

513 , 852 (1971) (abuse of discretion to dismiss for plaintiffs failure to set for trial within court imposed deadlines); ¶¶ 21, 23 , (abuse of discretion to grant motion in limine based on party’s failure to respond); Wayne Cook Enters., Inc. v. Fain Props.