Cited by

¶17 “Unless barred by the terms of the easement, the servient estate owner ‘is entitled to make any use of the servient estate that does not unreasonably interfere with enjoyment of the servitude.’” ¶ 21 (App. 2007) (quoting Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes (“Restatement”) § 4.9 cmt.

¶ 38 (App. 2007) (“future rights” cannot be determined in declaratory relief action “in anticipation of an event that may never happen”).

7 PETTERSEN v. PLEXUS, et al. Decision of the Court “request[]” that the court “declare what is ‘factually and legally incorrect’ on the K-1 tax form” failed to present a “concrete, justiciable controversy.” ¶16 “For a court to grant declaratory judgment, a justiciable controversy must exist.” ¶ 37 (App. 2007).

A justiciable controversy exists if there is “an assertion of a right, status, or legal relation in which the plaintiff has a definite interest and the denial of it by the opposing party.” ¶ 37 (App. 2007) (quoting Keggi v. Northbrook Prop.

of Maricopa Cnty., (easement does not alter legal title to property except as to the limited character of the easement); ¶¶ 17, 19 (App. 2011) (although use of servient estate may not impair use of easement, servient estate holder entitled to “other compatible uses of the land”); (“Unless barred by the terms of the easement, the servient estate owner ‘is entitled to make any use of the servient estate that does not unreasonably interfere with enjoyment of the servitude.’” (quoting Restatement (T

For the same reason, TMS’ is misplaced.

See Hunt v. Richardson , , 122 n.7, ¶ 25, , 1072 n.7 (App. 2007) (citing State ex rel.

¶ 37 (App. 2007) (internal quotation and citations omitted) (“For a court 5 PEARCE v. YUMA, et al. Decision of the Court to grant declaratory judgment, a justiciable controversy must exist.

3 and does not argue that Fir Drive was a common-law roadway dedication.

invites public use,” ¶ 17

In its written ruling, , for the proposition that “[a]n easement which consists of a roadway by its very nature invites public use unless the dedicator’s intent was otherwise.” And, because the court concluded “the language of the Tur[i]gli[a]tto deed does not reflect that the grantor intended to limit t

¶ 29 , (explaining the right to use land subject to an easement “remains in the owner of the fee so far as such right is consistent with the purpose and character of the easement”) (quotation omitted).

¶ 23, (sufficient acceptance when parties “purchased their properties with reference to the Survey”).