Cited by

(“We will not set aside the [trial] court’s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous, giving due regard to the opportunity of the court to judge the credibility of witnesses.” (alteration in Castro) ()).

In an appeal following a bench trial, “we review the evidence in a light most favorable to sustaining the verdict,” and will accept the superior court’s factual findings “unless clearly erroneous, giving due regard to the opportunity of the court to judge the credibility of witnesses.” ¶ 11 (App. 2009); Ariz. R. Civ.

¶ 11 (App. 2009); Ariz. R. Civ.

DISCUSSION ¶13 In an appeal after a bench trial, “we review the evidence in a light most favorable to sustaining the verdict,” and will accept the superior court’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous, “giving due regard to the opportunity of the court to judge the credibility of witnesses.” ¶ 11 (App. 2009); Ariz. R. Civ.

–52 ¶ 11 (App. 2009) Ample evidence supports the ALJ’s resolution of facts here.

–52, ¶ 11 (App. 2009) (citation omitted).

§ 14-2803(A); accord Castro v. Ballesteros–Suarez, ¶ 16 (App. 2009) (explaining Slayer Statute means “a killer cannot profit from that person’s wrong”).

¶¶ 6, 11 (App. 2009) (When reviewing a bench trial ruling, we give “due regard to the opportunity of the court to judge the credibility of witnesses.”).

Further, we will not “reweigh the evidence or substitute our evaluation of the facts.” ¶ 11 (App. 2009).

anted judgment as a matter of law on this issue is that Hernandez refused to answer any questions about phone use during his deposition.” They point out that, “in civil cases, fact finders are entitled to draw negative inferences against those who assert Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination.” n.2 (1994)