Cited by

See id.; ¶ 51 (2018); –38, ¶¶ 16–18 (App. 2012).

of Regents, ¶ 6 (App. 2015)); ¶ 11 (App. 2012).

¶ 16 (App. 2016) (“[A]bsent Arizona law to the contrary, Arizona courts will usually apply the law of the Restatement.”).

Thus, Capp relies on public policy to argue Welch owed her a duty to “ensur[e] that those using the vehicle are competent to drive.” ¶8 This court addressed a

¶ 6 (App. 2015) (holding that post-Gipson “foreseeability is not a part of the duty inquiry and those portions of pre-Gipson cases relying on foreseeability when addressing the issue are no longer valid”); Delci v. Gutierrez Trucking 5 ¶ 11 (App. 2012) (applying Gipson and holding that duty determinations in pre-Gipson cases “premised on a foreseeability analysis” are “no longer valid”).

¶21 Here, a duty of care arises from the relationship between North Star and VPS based upon a contract for professional services, ¶ 12 (App. 2012) (citing Gipson, 214 Ariz. at 145, ¶¶ 18-19 (explaining a duty of care may arise from a special relationship based upon contract)), and Appellants claim VPS was negligent in failing to thoroughly investigate Dickens’ authority to retain VPS’s services.

¶ 12 First, Restatement Third § 7(a) is significantly broader than Restatement Second § 315, 8 the latter of which “has been adopted in Arizona and applied in support of no-duty determinations absent a special relationship.” , 337-38 ¶ 16, (citing Fedie v. Travelodge Int’l, Inc., , , ).

Public policy used to determine the existence of a duty may be found in state statutory laws and the common law.” ¶ 12, (citations omitted).

¶ 11, (providing that a conclusion that no duty exists for a common law negligence claim is equivalent to a rule that a defendant “may not be held accountable for damages [it] carelessly [caused], no matter how unreasonable [its] conduct”); ¶ 8, (providing that whether a defendant owes the plaintiff a common law duty is a threshold issue; absent some duty, an action for negligence cannot be maintained).

Duty Arising from Relationship of the Parties ¶18 A legal duty “may arise from a special relationship based on contract, family relations, or conduct undertaken by the defendant, or may be based on categorical relationships recognized by the common law, such as landowner-invitee.” ¶ 12

A duty “may arise from a special relationship based on contract, family relations, or conduct undertaken by the defendant, or may be based on categorical relationships recognized by the common law, such as landowner-invitee.” ¶ 12

¶ 18; ¶ 12 , -22, ¶ 8 , -52 (2004) (stating “courts have imposed duties for the protection of persons with whom no preexisting ‘relationship’ existed”).