Cited by

-28, ¶ 10 (App. 2012) (noting that 12 HIRSCHI v. HIRSCHI Decision of the Court a contractual fee-shifting provision will be enforced according to its terms, as long as amount of fees awarded is “reasonable”).

See, ¶ 9 (App. 2012) (citing Connor v. Cal-Az Props, Inc., ).1 But the superior court also based its award on A.R.S.

Id.; ¶ 18 (App. 2012), disagreed with on other grounds in Am.

[when] *368 the parties have provided in their contract the conditions under which attorney’s fees may be recovered,” , see also Geller v. Lesk, 230 Ariz, 624, 627 ¶ 9, (stating that parties’ contractual attorney fee provision, “not the statute,” governs an award of fees); , 418 n.2, , 1242 n.2 (App. 1995) (stating that “when a contract has an attorney’s fee provision it controls to the exclusion of the statute”); Connor v.

10 MIRCHANDANI v. BMO Decision of the Court opposing the fee request to establish that the amount requested is clearly excessive.” ¶ 11 (App. 2012), as amended (Sept.

Ass’n, -71, -72 (App. 2007) (finding that, even where an attorneys’ fees provision entitles the prevailing party to “all attorneys’ fees and costs,” fees that are “obviously excessive” will not be awarded); -30, - 78 (App. 2012) (stating that, where a party seeking fees fails to make a prima facie showing of reasonableness, the trial court must determine the amount of reasonable fees incurred).

¶ 10 (App. 2012); see also Cypress on Sunland Homeowners Ass’n v. Orlandini, ¶ 31 (App. 2011) (“CC&Rs constitute a contract between property owners as a whole and individual lot owners.”) (citing Ahwatukee Custom Estates Mgmt.

at 471, 733 P.2d at 668; (citing Pioneer Roofing for principle that court will apply contract to determine fee award for named party, but “may award fees for other party under A.R.S.

¶ 8 (App. 2012), as amended (Sept.

¶¶ 19–20, (vacating fee award where requesting party failed to make a prima facie showing of reasonableness).