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¶ 5 (App. 2013) (“We will accept the court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous .

(“We will accept the court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.”); (“Factual findings ‘are not clearly erroneous if substantial evidence supports them,’ and ‘[s]ubstantial evidence is evidence which would permit a reasonable person to r

“In determining child support, the superior court must consider the reasonable needs of the children in light of the parents’ resources.” ¶ 23 (App. 2013).

I. Father’s Gross Income ¶10 The superior court has broad discretion to set child support awards and “we will uphold the award unless it is devoid of competent evidence.” ¶ 16 (App. 2013) (cleaned up).

¶ 25 (App. 2013) (finding that expenses associated with households must be considered in marriages involving significant wealth, to allow the “children who have enjoyed such benefits to continue to receive them after the dissolution.”).

“We will accept the court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, but [] draw our own legal conclusions from facts found or implied in the judgment.” ¶ 5 (App. 2013) ( ¶ 6 (App. 2002)).

We accept factual findings that are not clearly erroneous, but we “draw our own legal conclusions from facts found or implied in the judgment.” ¶ 5 (App. 2013).

Additionally, the court stated that “[a] balance must be struck between the reasonable needs of the child and the parent’s ability to pay.” Although this factor was relevant, given the parties’ combined high income, ¶ 23 (App. 2013) (holding the court may consider “the reasonable benefits, beyond [the] ‘basic needs,’ accorded to the child[] during the marriage”), the parties presented no evidence regarding the child’s reasonable needs or previous lifestyle.

“Although not all prior restraints are invalid, they come with a heavy presumption against constitutional validity.” -82, ¶ 32 (App. 2013).

2054 , or to infringe on the parent's or the child's free speech, see Nash v. Nash , , 481-82, ¶ 32, , 48-49 (App. 2013) (parenting-time restriction that constitutes prior restraint on speech valid only under strict scrutiny test); see also Goodman , 239 Ariz. at 115 n.2, ¶ 18, 366 P.3d at 592 n.2 (noting that "any order restraining speech is constitutionally suspect").

478, ¶¶ 8, 16 (App. 2013); A.R.S.

“We will accept the court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, but we draw our own legal conclusions from facts found or implied in the judgment.” ¶ 5

The superior court order found the Children “went on luxurious trips, including ski trips and cruises, during the marriage.” While the superior court may consider these expenses for children who have enjoyed such benefits before dissolution of the marriage, ¶ 25 (App. 2013), there is no evidence in the record to support a finding that the parties took “luxurious trips,” much less the amount attributed by the court.

n.8, ¶ 22 (App. 2013) (explaining that child support in excess of the standard needs of the children is not necessarily in children’s best interests).