Cited by

Ass’n, ¶ 14 (App. 2013) (citing Santa Fe Ridge Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Bartschi, ¶ 11 (App. 2008) and Coventry Homes, 155 Ariz. at 217); Warren v. Whitehall Income Fund 86, (“Constructive notice and actual notice have the same effect and when the purchaser of land has notice

Ass’n, ¶ 25 (App. 2013) ( ¶ 16 (1998)).

Filing a lis pendens “merely asserts an interest in a property by providing constructive notice to lenders or prospective purchasers of a pending lawsuit that could affect the property’s title.” Stauffer v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, ¶ 14 (App. 2013).

Stauffer v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, ¶ 10 (App. 2013).

¶6 Section 33-420 serves to “protect property owners from actions clouding title to their property.” Stauffer v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n., ¶ 25 (App. 2013) (quotation omitted).

§ 33-420(B) (emphasis added); ¶ 19 (App. 2013) (finding "an action to clear title of a false or fraudulent document that asserts an interest in real property may be joined with an action for damages under § 33-420").

Ass'n, ¶25 (App. 2013); ¶ 8 (App. 2006) (noting “[r]ipeness is analogous to standing”).

Ass’n, ¶¶ 8–9 (App. 2013).

See Stauffer v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n , , ¶ 10, (finding language in § 33-420(A)"unambiguous" and therefore applying plain meaning without statutory interpretation).

Co., n.1, ¶ 3 (App. 2013) (citing Stauffer v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, n.1, ¶ 2 (App. 2013)).

The Stauffers appealed, and in Stauffer v. US Bank Nat’l Ass’n, –29, ¶¶ 15, 19, 22, 27, –80 (App. 2013), this court reversed the trial court, holding that the Recorded Documents did assert an interest in the Property, that the Stauffers thus could seek to clear title under § 33-420(B), and the Stauffers had standing to clear title as owners of the Property.

Id.; cf. Stauffer v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, ¶ 12 (App. 2013) (stating that because substitute trustee held legal title for beneficiary, substitute trustee’s recording of notice of trustee’s sale fell within the ambit of A.R.S.

Stauffer v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, see also TDB Tucson Grp., (principles of statutory construction applied unless legislature “‘provides a specific definition or the context of the statute indicates a specific meaning’”), quoting Mercy Hea

Ass'n, -78 (App. 2013); Sitton, 233 Ariz. at 219, ¶ 17, 311 P.3d at 241.