Cited by

¶ 9 (App. 2019); ¶ 11 (App. 2013); (explaining the superior court has “broad discretion in determining what will be the most beneficial for the children” and “is in the best position to determine what is in the children’s interest” (citations omitted)).

-74, ¶¶ 10, 20 (App. 2013) (waiver is a discretionary doctrine, not an “unalterable rule,” and the superior court has an “obligation to equitably divide” community property).

¶ 15 (App. 2013) (collecting cases).

are for the [family] court alone to decide.” ¶ 14 (App. 2013) (quoting DePasquale v. Sup.

25, 2022), we refuse to apply waiver 4 SAMANTHA O. v. JEFFREY F. et al. Decision of the Court here because the best interests of the children subject to the termination order trumps the consequences ordinarily imposed for violating procedural rules, ¶ 10 (App. 2013).

¶ 5 (1999) (citation omitted); ¶ 11 (App. 2013) (citation omitted).

§ 25-403(B); ¶ 11 (App. 2013).

Nevertheless, we may review a waived argument in our discretion, and, in light of the liberty interests implicated by forced administration of anti-psychotic medication, as well as the long- established requirement of strict statutory compliance, we do so here.

Further, we disagree with Father that the court abdicated its responsibility to use its independent judgment, -74, ¶ 14 (App. 2013), and DePasquale v. Superior Court (Thrasher), by quoting the older child’s counselor when making its findings.

¶ 11 (App. 2013) (parenting issues); ¶ 8 (App. 2018) (child support); ¶ 6 (App. 2019) (property).

¶16 We review the family court’s denial of a petition for legal decision-making and parenting time for an abuse of discretion, ¶ 11 (App. 2013), and the denial of a motion for reconsideration, ¶ 16 (App. 2009).

¶ 11 (App. 2013) (parenting time); ¶ 8 (App. 2018) (child support); ¶ 6 (App. 2019) (property division and attorney’s fees).

See, ¶ 14 (App. 2013); ¶ 7 (App. 2003)

-74 ¶ 14 (App. 2013) (applying A.R.S.

See, ¶ 10 (App. 2013) (Waiver does not apply when it conflicts with a child’s best interests.).

¶22 “The [superior] court has an obligation to equitably divide clearly identified community property.” ¶ 20 (App. 2013).