Joseph v. Joseph

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

MARCIE JOSEPH, Petitioner/Appellant,

v.

BRIAN JOSEPH, Respondent/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 22-0722 FC
FILED 10-3-2023

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County
No. P1300DO20070013
The Honorable Cele Hancock, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Law Offices of A. Thomas Smith, PLLC, Scottsdale
By A. Thomas Smith
Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant

Brian Joseph, Chino Valley
Respondent/Appellee
 JOSEPH v. JOSEPH
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Andrew M. Jacobs delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Michael J. Brown and Chief Judge David B. Gass joined.

J A C O B S, Judge:

¶1 Marcie Joseph (Wife) appeals the superior court’s denial of
her petition to compel Brian Joseph (Husband) to sell their former marital
residence, as required by the original consent decree in their 2007 divorce.
Because Wife later signed away her rights in that residence (which was
later sold), and because Wife does not develop arguments that the
superior court erred in denying her petition, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Husband and Wife divorced in 2007. In a consent decree,
the parties agreed to sell their marital home. They agreed on an initial
listing price of $490,000 subject to review every 60 days, and to accept the
highest offer within $10,000 of the listing price. They also agreed that
Wife would receive: (a) $80,000 from the sale; (b) 50% of the remaining
proceeds; and (c) $19,000 from Husband’s 50% share of the sale as a
property equalization payment. The consent decree stated that if the sale
did not result in Wife receiving $80,000, whatever lesser amount the sale
netted would satisfy Husband’s payment obligations under the consent
decree.

¶3 The parties were unable to sell the home due to plunging
home values during the Great Recession. Wife agreed with Husband to
take the house off the market and rent it. Wife rented the home to tenants
from 2007 until 2012, at which point the parties relisted the home. In June
2012, Trustee Corps initiated a foreclosure sale of the home for
nonpayment of the mortgage.

¶4 In late June 2012, after the foreclosure sale was initiated, the
parties amended the consent decree to require Husband to pay Wife
$19,000 over four years in exchange for Wife’s interest in the marital
home. Wife signed a warranty deed conveying the home to Husband as
well as escrow documents affirming that she would receive no portion of
the proceeds from the sale.

2
 JOSEPH v. JOSEPH
Decision of the Court

¶5 Before the foreclosure sale could occur, Michelle Vancore
purchased the home at a short sale for $180,000. Husband later married
Vancore and lived with her in the home. Vancore passed away in 2017,
resulting in Husband reacquiring the home.

¶6 Wife learned in 2020 that Vancore had bought the house.
Wife believes that prior to selling her interest in the home to Husband, he
and Vancore planned to have Vancore purchase the home once it was up
for foreclosure. Wife has not yet received the full $19,000 from Husband.

¶7 In March 2022, Wife sued Husband seeking to enforce the
2007 consent decree by compelling him to sell the marital home. The
superior court held an evidentiary hearing during which Wife testified
that she signed (1) the warranty deed conveying her interest in the home
to Husband, and (2) the amendment to the consent decree under which
her only right was to the future payment of $19,000. The court granted
Husband’s motion for directed verdict on Wife’s motion, relying on her
signature on the warranty deed, while noting that Wife may have other
claims.

DISCUSSION

¶8 We review the superior court’s ruling on a post-decree
petition to enforce a court order for abuse of discretion. See In re Marriage
of Priessman, 228 Ariz. 336, 338 ¶ 7 (App. 2011). Separately “we review de
novo the trial court's interpretation of a decree of dissolution.” Chopin v.
Chopin, 224 Ariz. 425, 427 ¶ 6 (App. 2010).

¶9 Wife asserts Husband acted inequitably toward her and thus
committed wrongdoing in his dealings concerning the marital residence.
Yet other than acknowledging the correct standard of review, Wife cites
no legal authorities or specific facts of record to develop any particular
argument. We generally only review developed arguments. See Polanco v.
Indus. Comm’n of Ariz., 214 Ariz. 489, 491 ¶ 6 n.2 (App. 2007) (concluding
argument was waived where plaintiff cited no relevant supporting
authority and did not develop it); State v. Johnson, 247 Ariz. 166, 180, 192
¶¶ 13, 76 (2019) (declining to consider undeveloped, legally unsupported
arguments); ARCAP 13(a)(7) (requiring arguments to contain supporting
reasons for each contention, and with citations of legal authorities and
appropriate references to the record). Accordingly, Wife’s contentions on
appeal are waived.

3
 JOSEPH v. JOSEPH
Decision of the Court

¶10 Despite that waiver, we elect to address what we understand
to be the merits of Wife’s appeal. See State v. Smith, 203 Ariz. 75, 79 ¶ 12
(2002) (exercising discretion to address waived issues). Wife’s appeal
centers on her request to enforce an already-satisfied condition of the
consent decree that the house be sold. There is no dispute in the record
that the marital residence was sold in 2012. Thus, even if Wife were
enforcing the original consent decree, the sale she petitioned to compel
already occurred. For that reason, the superior court did not err when it
denied her petition to compel an already-completed sale. See Sedona Priv.
Prop. Owners Ass’n v. City of Sedona, 192 Ariz. 126, 127 ¶ 5 (App. 1998)
(noting “[a] case becomes moot when an event occurs which would cause
the outcome of the appeal to have no practical effect on the parties.”).

¶11 Moreover, the superior court apparently determined that
Wife conveyed her interest in the home to Husband through the warranty
deed, and that what Wife still held in the amended consent decree was a
right to be paid $19,000 in the future. Wife thus no longer had a right to
compel the sale of the residence. For this reason too, the superior court
properly granted a directed verdict to Husband. For these reasons, even
reaching the merits of Wife’s appeal, we must affirm. See Ramos v. Nichols, 252 Ariz. 519, 522 ¶ 8 (App. 2022) (affirming where appellant failed to
establish a factual issue). As the superior court noted, Wife may have a
separate action under these facts, but those other potential claims are not
before us in this appeal. See Childress Buick Co. v. O’Connell, 198 Ariz. 454,
459 ¶ 29 (App. 2000) (declining to decide issues not raised by the parties).

¶12 Finally, Wife asserts in her reply brief that Husband forced
her into amending the consent decree. Wife also asserts that Husband
forged her signature, despite her testimony that the handwriting expert
she hired verified the contrary. Because Wife raised these arguments for
the first time in her reply brief, they are waived. State v. Garcia, 220 Ariz.
49, 52 ¶ 9 n.2 (App. 2008). We also do not reach these contentions because
they are not developed with case authority. See Polanco, 214 Ariz. at 491 ¶
6 n.2 (concluding argument was waived where plaintiff cited no relevant
supporting authority and did not develop it further).

4
 JOSEPH v. JOSEPH
Decision of the Court

CONCLUSION

¶13 For the reasons stated, we affirm the superior court’s denial
of Wife’s petition to compel the sale of the former marital residence.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AA

5