Gharadaghian v. Olives

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

MEGHAN GHARADAGHIAN, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

MONICA OLIVES, Defendant/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0465
FILED 01-26-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2025-003985
The Honorable Jason Easterday, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Meghan Gharadaghian, (Protected)
Plaintiff/Appellant

Monica Olives, Phoenix
Defendant/Appellee

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge David B. Gass delivered the decision of the court, in which
Judge Anni Hill Foster and Chief Judge Randall M. Howe joined.
 GHARADAGHIAN v. OLIVES
Decision of the Court

G A S S, Judge:

¶1 Gharadaghian appeals the superior court’s order quashing
her injunction against harassment following an evidentiary hearing.
Because Gharadaghian did not provide a transcript for appellate review
and raises no debatable issues, the superior court did not abuse its
discretion. The court thus affirms.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Gharadaghian sought an injunction against harassment
against her neighbor, Olives. Gharadaghian alleged Olives:

1. Yelled at Gharadaghian;

2. Stalked Gharadaghian while Gharadaghian was speaking
to police and firefighters;

3. Watched Gharadaghian for another neighbor with whom
Gharadaghian had a dispute;

4. Gave Gharadaghian (and her 14 year-old daughter) the
middle finger;

5. Videotaped Gharadaghian (one of the times with
Gharadaghian’s daughter):

6. Complained about Gharadaghian’s daughter loudly in
common areas; and

7. Admitted she was watching Gharadaghian from her
balcony.

The superior court granted the injunction without a hearing.

¶3 More than 100 days after the superior court issued the
injunction, Olives requested a hearing, which the superior court held.
Gharadaghian and her daughter testified on Gharadaghian’s behalf. The
superior court admitted 5 of Gharadaghian’s exhibits: a police report,
emails Gharadaghian sent the homeowners’ association about Olives,
materials from the homeowners’ association showing Gharadaghian as a
candidate for the board, a 5-year history of police calls from the community,
and a flash drive. The flash drive included videos of Gharadaghian
videotaping Olives.

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Decision of the Court

¶4 The superior court also heard from 2 witnesses for Olives, 1
of which was Gharadaghian’s daughter. The superior court also received 2
exhibits from Olives. Both were emails Olives sent the homeowners’
association about Gharadaghian.

¶5 The superior court later issued its order, finding
Gharadaghian did not meet “her burden under A.R.S. § 12-1810 and the
Arizona Rules of Protective Order Procedure.” The superior court thus
quashed Gharadaghian’s injunction against harassment against Olives.

¶6 The court has jurisdiction over Gharadaghian’s timely appeal
under Article VI, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, and A.R.S. §§
12-120.21.A.1 and -2101.A.5(b) (giving the court jurisdiction over an
order “[g]ranting or dissolving an injunction or refusing to grant or
dissolve an injunction or appointing a receiver”).

DISCUSSION

¶7 The court views the facts, including all reasonable inferences,
in the light most favorable to upholding the superior court’s ruling, “giving
due regard to the [superior] court’s opportunity to judge the credibility of
the witnesses.” Vanwormer v. Lopez, 259 Ariz. 87, 89 ¶ 6 (App. 2025) (cleaned
up) (reviewing superior court’s continuance of an order of protection
following an evidentiary hearing). The court will not reweigh the evidence
on appeal. See id.

¶8 Because Gharadaghian argues the evidence does not support
the superior court’s order, Gharadaghian was responsible for filing any
transcripts she wanted the court to consider under Rule 11(c), Arizona
Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure. Gharadaghian did not. She also did not
ask the court to accept a video or audio recording of the proceedings under
Rule 11(f), Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure. The court thus
presumes the missing transcripts support the superior court’s ruling. See
Myrick v. Maloney, 235 Ariz. 491, 495 ¶ 11 (App. 2014).

I. Though Gharadaghian’s opening brief does not comply with the
Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure, the court will
consider whether Olives confessed error by not filing an
answering brief.

¶9 The court must ensure “litigants conform to an acceptable,
minimal level of competency and performance and we owe this
responsibility to the judiciary, the bar and, more importantly, to all litigants
and the people as a whole.” Ramos v. Nichols, 252 Ariz. 519, 522 ¶ 8 (App.

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Decision of the Court

2022) (cleaned up). “An appellant who fails to make a bona fide and
reasonably intelligent effort to comply with the rules will waive issues and
arguments.” Id. (cleaned up). The court holds Gharadaghian, a self-
represented litigant, to the same standards as a lawyer and does not afford
her special leniency. Id.

¶10 Gharadaghian’s brief includes no “table of contents” or “table
of citations.” See Ariz. R. Civ. App. Proc. 13(a)(1)–(2). She includes several
alleged references to a recording of the evidentiary hearing (including time
stamps and direct quotes), but neither the recording nor the transcript of it
are in the record. See id. at (d). She includes no citation to case law. See id. at
(f). Gharadaghian also does not properly cite any legal authority or make
any substantive argument. See id. at (a)(7)(A) (“Appellant’s contentions
concerning each issue presented for review, with supporting reasons for
each contention, and with citations of legal authorities and appropriate
references to the portions of the record on which the appellant relies.”). As
to the relevant order, Gharadaghian’s opening brief does not set forth any
legal grounds or identifiable arguments for reversing. At best, she says the
evidence does not support the superior court’s order so the superior court
must have abused its discretion. For that reason, the court could consider
Gharadaghian to have abandoned and waived her claim. State v. Carver, 160
Ariz. 167, 175 (1989) (“Failure to argue a claim usually constitutes
abandonment and waiver of that claim.”) (citation omitted).

¶11 Even so, the court exercises its discretion and considers
Gharadaghian’s appeal further to determine whether Olives confessed
error by failing to file an answering brief.

II. Though Olives did not file an answering brief, the court will not
treat that omission as a confession of error.

¶12 The court could treat Olives’ failure to file an answering brief
as a confession of error. See Welch v. United Mut. Benefit Ass’n, 48 Ariz. 173,
174 (1936) (quoting Navarro v. State, 32 Ariz. 119, 120 (1927)); see, e.g., Skelsey
v. Kuhn, 23 Ariz. 367, 369 (1922); Hatch v. Leighton et al., 24 Ariz. 300, 305
(1922). But the court grants relief on confession of error only if the appellant
raises a debatable question, and “no reasonable excuse is shown for the
[appellee’s] failure to appear and file a brief.” Welch, 48 Ariz. at 175; see also
Navarro, 32 Ariz. at 120–21 (assuming appellee confesses error if appellant
raises a debatable question and appellee has no reasonable excuse for not
filing an answering brief); see also Carter v. State ex rel. Eyman, 5 Ariz. App.
415 (1967) (“[T]he failure to file an answering brief does not constitute a
confession of reversible error since no debatable issue is presented.”).

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Decision of the Court

¶13 The Arizona Supreme Court characterized a debatable
question as one requiring “much industry and independent research to
refute.” Merrill v. Wheeler, 17 Ariz. 348, 350 (1915). It must spark “at least
grave doubt” in the superior court’s order. Adkins v. Adkins, 39 Ariz. 530,
532 (1932). And any questions asked must raise a novel legal issue. See
Childs v. Frederickson, 21 Ariz. 248, 249 (1920).

¶14 Gharadaghian’s opening brief contains none of these
characteristics. First, because Gharadaghian makes no legal arguments,
Olives had nothing to research. See Ariz. R. Civ. App. Proc. 13(a)(7)(A).
Second, Gharadaghian insists the superior court did not properly weigh the
evidence, was confused, should have ruled differently on some points,
should have found Olives not credible, and should have found
Gharadaghian credible. Gharadaghian further argues the superior court
considered events outside the listed dates in the petition, the superior court
should have inferred Olives was seeking a delay to “fabricate” evidence
and pressure witnesses, and the superior court erred in overruling her
objections.

¶15 But Gharadaghian provided no evidence to create a “grave
doubt” in the superior court’s decision. See Adkins, 39 Ariz. at 532. At best,
she wants the court to reweigh the evidence and draw different inferences
from it, which the court will not do. See Vanwormer, 259 Ariz. at 89 ¶ 6. And
third, rather than raising any novel legal questions, Gharadaghian
continues to make conclusory statements that the superior court was simply
wrong.

¶16 Conclusory statements, without more, do not create a
debatable issue. See Merrill, 17 Ariz. at 350; Adkins, 39 Ariz. at 532; Childs, 21
Ariz. at 249. After examining both the record and Gharadaghian’s opening
brief, the court concludes Gharadaghian raises no debatable question and
thus does not treat Olives’ failure to file an answering brief as a confession
of error. The court thus may affirm the superior court’s decision. See Verdex
Steel & Constr. Co. v. Bd. of Supervisors, Maricopa Cnty., 19 Ariz. App. 547, 551
(1973) (citation omitted).

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Decision of the Court

CONCLUSION

¶17 The court affirms.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JT

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