Terrell v. Beck

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

KEHYANA TERRELL, Petitioner/Appellant,

v.

ANDREW BECK, Respondent/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0468 FC
FILED 12-10-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. FC2025-001362
The Honorable Steven McCarthy, Judge

AFFIRMED

APPEARANCES

Kehyana Terrell, Phoenix
Petitioner/Appellant

Andrew Beck, Peoria
Respondent/Appellee
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge David B. Gass delivered the decision of the court, in which
Judge Michael J. Brown and Judge Andrew J. Becke joined.

G A S S, Judge:

¶1 Terrell appeals the superior court’s order dismissing her
order of protection against Beck. Because the superior court did not abuse
its discretion, the court affirms.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 The court views the facts in the light most favorable to
upholding the superior court’s ruling. IB Prop. Holdings, LLC v. Rancho Del
Mar Apartments Ltd. P’ship, 228 Ariz. 61, 63 ¶ 2 (App. 2011). Terrell was
responsible for filing any transcripts she wanted the court to consider, but
she filed none. See Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 11(c). The court thus presumes the
missing transcripts support the superior court’s ruling. Myrick v. Maloney, 235 Ariz. 491, 495 ¶ 11 (App. 2014).

¶3 Terrell and Beck have a child in common. They are parties to
a separate custody action. They did not seek to consolidate the two cases.

¶4 In April 2025, Terrell petitioned for an ex parte order of
protection against Beck. The petition alleged Beck had been harassing
Terrell throughout the year before she filed the petition. Terrell’s petition
says Beck had been stalking her, demanding she answer questions about
her personal life, and threatening to seek a contempt order against her. The
superior court granted Terrell’s ex parte petition, which ordered Beck not to
go near Terrell’s residence and workplace, and restricted his contact with
Terrell to discussing the child using OurFamilyWizard.com, a website to
facilitate co-parenting.

¶5 Beck timely requested a hearing to contest the protective
order, saying Terrell obtained the order “to weaponize the court as it
pertains to our custody dispute.” The superior court held an evidentiary
hearing. After that hearing, the superior court dismissed Terrell’s protective
order, finding she failed to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence,
Beck committed, or will commit in the future, an act of domestic violence.

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¶6 The court has jurisdiction under Article VI, Section 9, of the
Arizona Constitution, and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21, 12-21001.A.1, A.5(b), and
Arizona Rules of Protective Order Procedure 42(b)(2).

DISCUSSION

I. Though Terrell’s opening brief does not comply with Rule 13,
Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure, the court will review
her challenge on the merits.

¶7 Beck argues the court should rule Terrell waived her
arguments on appeal because her opening brief does not conform with Rule
13, Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure.

¶8 “An appellant who fails to make a bona fide and reasonably
intelligent effort to comply with the rules will waive issues and arguments
not supported by an adequate explanation, citations to the record, or
authority.” Ramos v. Nichols, 252 Ariz. 519, 522 ¶ 8 (App. 2022) (cleaned up).
Under Rule 13, the opening brief must set forward “a statement of the case
that must concisely state the nature of the case, the course of the
proceedings, the disposition in the court from which the appeal is taken,
and the basis of the appellate court’s jurisdiction” with appropriate
references to the record. Ariz. R. Civ. App. Proc. 13(a)(4); Ramos, 252 Ariz at
522 ¶ 8. The court holds Terrell, a self-represented litigant, to the same
standards as an attorney and does not afford her special leniency. See Flynn
v. Campbell, 243 Ariz. 76, 83–84 ¶ 24 (2017).

¶9 Terrell’s opening brief does not set forth any legal grounds or
arguments for reversing the superior court’s order. Terrell also did not
include citations to the record. See Ariz. R. Civ. App. Proc. 13(a)(7)(A)
(requiring appellant’s brief to contain arguments with “citations of legal
authorities and appropriate references to the portions of the record on
which the appellant relies”). The court thus could treat her failure to refer
to legal authority and the record as abandonment and waiver of her claim.
See id.; State v. Carver, 160 Ariz. 167, 175 (1989) (“Failure to argue a claim
usually constitutes abandonment and waiver of that claim.”) (citation
omitted).

¶10 Even so, the court exercises its discretion to decide this appeal
on its merits based on its own review of the record. See Adams v. Valley Nat’l
Bank of Ariz., 139 Ariz. 340, 342 (App. 1984) (recognizing courts prefer to
decide each case upon its merits rather than dismissing on procedural
grounds).

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II. Terrell does not show the superior court abused its discretion
when it denied her petition following an evidentiary hearing.

¶11 The court reviews the superior court’s decision to deny a
petition for protective order following an evidentiary hearing for abuse of
discretion. See Cardoso v. Soldo, 230 Ariz. 614, 619 ¶ 16 (App. 2012). “The
[superior] court abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law in
reaching a discretionary conclusion or when the record, viewed in the light
most favorable to upholding the [superior] court’s decision, is devoid of
competent evidence to support the decision.” Michaelson v. Garr, 234 Ariz.
542, 544 ¶ 5 (App. 2014) (quotation omitted). The court does not reweigh
evidence on appeal. Hurd v. Hurd, 223 Ariz. 48, 52 ¶ 16 (App. 2009).

¶12 Terrell, as the party seeking a protective order, bore the
burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, the superior court
should issue the order. See Ariz. R. Protective Ord. Proc. 38(g)(3).

¶13 To meet that burden, Terrell needed to establish reasonable
cause to believe Beck either “may commit an act of domestic violence” or
“has committed an act of domestic violence within the past year or within
a longer period of time if the court finds that good cause exists to consider
a longer period.” See A.R.S. § 13-3602.E.1 (“may commit”) –E.2 (“has
committed”). Domestic violence includes a wide array of criminal acts,
including harassment through verbal or electronic communication. See
A.R.S. § 13-2921.A.1. Harassment requires the person knowingly commit
repeated acts which would cause a reasonable person to be seriously
alarmed, annoyed, humiliated, or mentally distressed. A.R.S. § 13-2921.E.

¶14 Terrell identifies no legal error. Instead, she reargues facts.
Terrell argues the superior court abused its discretion because it ignored
her evidence and dismissed her petition on improper grounds. She argues
Beck is an abuser who made multiple threats and intimidation. And she
says his acts caused her and her unborn child to have hypertension and end
up in the emergency room.

¶15 Her arguments do not satisfy the abuse-of-discretion
standard, especially when the court presumes, as it must, that any gaps in
the record support the superior court’s order. See Bee-Gee, Inc. v. Ariz. Dep’t
of Econ. Sec., 142 Ariz. 410, 414 (App. 1984) (presuming “[i]f the record is
incomplete, . . . the missing portions support the [superior court’s]
actions”); see also State v. Geeslin, 223 Ariz. 553, 554 ¶ 5 (2010) (“When
‘matters are not included in the record on appeal, the missing portions of

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the record will be presumed to support the action of the trial court.’”)
(quoting State v. Zuck, 134 Ariz. 509, 513 (1982)).

¶16 At bottom, Terrell asks the court to reweigh the evidence
about times when she felt stressed, threatened, and harassed because of
Beck’s actions. But the superior court did not find Beck’s actions constituted
harassment. And although Terrell believes she proved she and her unborn
child experienced hypertension, it does not mean she proved Beck
committed or may commit an act of domestic violence.

¶17 As a final point, Terrell argues the superior court’s ruling was
biased. The court presumes a superior court judge acts free of bias and
prejudice. State v. Ramsey, 211 Ariz. 529, 541 ¶ 38 (App. 2005). To overcome
that presumption, Terrell had to show bias by a preponderance of the
evidence. Id. Terrell did not make that showing.

CONCLUSION

¶18 The court affirms.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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