Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Walker v. City of Scottsdale, 786 P.2d 1057.

103 citing documents.

Mba v. Scottsdale Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
Mba v. Scottsdale Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
so that no part of the [ordinance] will be void, inert, redundant, or trivial.’” ¶14 13 MBA v. SCOTTSDALE, et al. Williams, J., dissenting (App. 1999) ().
Imatdinov v. Imatdinov Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
Imatdinov v. Imatdinov Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
6 IMATDINOV v. IMATDINOV Decision of the Court ¶19 In interpreting a statute, we must give meaning to each word, phrase, or clause “so that no part of the statute will be void, inert, redundant, or trivial.”
Romero v. Hasan 388 P.3d 22 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
Romero v. Hasan 388 P.3d 22 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
¶8 A statute’s language is “the most reliable evidence of its intent.” McMurray v. Dream Catcher USA, Inc., ¶ 8, ( ).
tempe/chavez v. state/brnovich 351 P.3d 367 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
tempe/chavez v. state/brnovich 351 P.3d 367 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
MacKinney v. City of Tucson 299 P.3d 1282 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
MacKinney v. City of Tucson 299 P.3d 1282 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
Arizona Department of Revenue v. South Point Energy Center, LLC 268 P.3d 387 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
Arizona Department of Revenue v. South Point Energy Center, LLC 268 P.3d 387 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
(noting that when construing statutes “each word, phrase, clause, and sentence must be given meaning so that no part ...
TOHONO O'ODHAM NATION v. City of Glendale 253 P.3d 632 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
TOHONO O'ODHAM NATION v. City of Glendale 253 P.3d 632 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
Leflet v. Redwood Fire & Casualty Insurance 247 P.3d 180 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
Leflet v. Redwood Fire & Casualty Insurance 247 P.3d 180 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
at 5, 147 P.3d at 759 ( , ).
STATE EX REL. INDUS. COM'N v. Galloway 230 P.3d 708 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
STATE EX REL. INDUS. COM'N v. Galloway 230 P.3d 708 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
T.P. Racing, L.L.L.P. v. Arizona Department of Racing 222 P.3d 280 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
T.P. Racing, L.L.L.P. v. Arizona Department of Racing 222 P.3d 280 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
Sharpe v. Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System 207 P.3d 741 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
Sharpe v. Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System 207 P.3d 741 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
so that no part of the statute will be void, inert, redundant, or trivial.’ ” ( , )).
Jones v. Weston 212 P.3d 835 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
Jones v. Weston 212 P.3d 835 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
McMurray v. Dream Catcher USA, Inc., , see also Cornman Tweedy 560
In re MH 2008-000028 211 P.3d 1261 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
In Re Mh Xxxx-Xxxxxx 211 P.3d 1261 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
In Re Mh Xxxx-Xxxxxx 211 P.3d 1261 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
In re MH 2008-000028 211 P.3d 1261 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
McMurray v. Dream Catcher USA, Inc. 202 P.3d 536 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
McMurray v. Dream Catcher USA, Inc. 202 P.3d 536 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
“The language of a statute is the most reliable evidence of its intent.”
Michael Redhair v. Kinerk, Beal, Schmidt, Dyer & Sethi, P.C. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
Michael Redhair v. Kinerk, Beal, Schmidt, Dyer & Sethi, P.C. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
State v. Thomas 175 P.3d 71 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
State v. Thomas 175 P.3d 71 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
so that no part of the statute will be void, inert, redundant, or trivial.’” Phoenix City Prosecutor’s ¶ 21 , ( , (internal citations omitted)).
Phoenix City Prosecutor's Office v. Ybarra 160 P.3d 695 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
Phoenix City Prosecutor's Office v. Ybarra 160 P.3d 695 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
(cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain legislative intent, and court should interpret statute so as to give it a fair and sensible meaning); ¶ 14 , ( , ) (noting court avoids interpreting statute “so as to render any of its language mere ‘surplusage,’ [and instead] give meaning to ‘each word, phrase, clause, and sentence ...
In Re Estate of Rodriguez 160 P.3d 679 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
Followed In Re Estate of Rodriguez 160 P.3d 679 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
Stein v. Sonus USA, Inc. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
Stein v. Sonus USA, Inc. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
¶17 P.2d 1057 (App. 1989), Stein next argues interpreting § 44-1351(1) to exclude hearing aids would render the statute’s references to “communication,” “hear[ing],” “spe[aking],” and “manipulat[ing] the consumer’s environment” meaningless.
Yarbrough v. Montoya-Paez 147 P.3d 755 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2006
Yarbrough v. Montoya-Paez 147 P.3d 755 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2006
To determine legislative intent, we look first to the language the legislature has used as providing “the most reliable evidence of its intent.”
Mago v. Mercedes-Benz, U.S.A., Inc. 142 P.3d 712 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2006
Mago v. Mercedes-Benz, U.S.A., Inc. 142 P.3d 712 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2006
¶ 14 , ( , ) (noting court avoids interpreting statute “so as to render any of its language mere ‘surplusage,’ [and instead] give meaning to ‘each word, phrase, clause, and sentence ...
Butch Randolph & Associates, Inc. v. International Fidelity Insurance 136 P.3d 232 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2006
Butch Randolph & Associates, Inc. v. International Fidelity Insurance 136 P.3d 232 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2006
We strive to avoid an interpretation that makes parts of a statute “void, inert, redundant, or trivial.”
State of Arizona v. Rene A. Sanchez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
State of Arizona v. Rene A. Sanchez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
Better Homes Construction, Inc. v. Goldwater 53 P.3d 1139 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
Better Homes Construction, Inc. v. Goldwater 53 P.3d 1139 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
3 See Wells Fargo Credit Corp. v. Tolliver, 183 * (“In interpreting a statute, [courts] look primarily to the language of the statute and give effect to the statutory terms according to their ordinary meanings unless the legislature has provided a specific definition ....”); , (stating that the language of a statute is the most reliable indicator of its intent, and when a statute expressly defines certain words, a court is bound by the legislative definition in all cases where the rights of liti