Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Walker v. City of Scottsdale, 786 P.2d 1057.

103 citing documents.

Citadel Care Center v. Arizona Department of Revenue 25 P.3d 1158 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
Citadel Care Center v. Arizona Department of Revenue 25 P.3d 1158 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
so that no part of the statute will be void, inert, redundant, or trivial.’ ”) ( , ).
State v. Hoggatt 18 P.3d 1239 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2001
State v. Hoggatt 18 P.3d 1239 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2001
To do so, we are mindful that “[t]he language of a statute is the most reliable evidence of its intent.”
Johnson v. Davis 12 P.3d 1203 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
Johnson v. Davis 12 P.3d 1203 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
so that no part of the statute will be void, inert, redundant, or trivial.’” ¶ 14 , ( , ).
State v. Samano 11 P.3d 1045 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
State v. Samano 11 P.3d 1045 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
While we must attempt to discern and effectuate the legislature’s intent, , we look to “[t]he language of [the] statute [as] the most reliable evidence of its intent.”
Milner v. Colonial Trust Co. 6 P.3d 329 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
Milner v. Colonial Trust Co. 6 P.3d 329 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
“The language of a statute is the most reliable evidence of its intent.”
Herman v. City of Tucson 4 P.3d 973 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1999
Herman v. City of Tucson 4 P.3d 973 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1999
¶ 14 Third, when “a statute expressly defines certain words and terms used in the statute, the court is bound by the legislative definition in all cases where rights of parties litigant are based upon statute.”
Drucker v. Greater Phoenix Transportation Co. 3 P.3d 961 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
Drucker v. Greater Phoenix Transportation Co. 3 P.3d 961 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
“The language of a statute is the most reliable evidence of its intent.”
Blanchard v. Show Low Planning & Zoning Commission 993 P.2d 1078 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
Blanchard v. Show Low Planning & Zoning Commission 993 P.2d 1078 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
“The language of a statute is the most reliable evidence of its intent.”
Columbia Parcar Corp. v. Arizona Department of Transportation 971 P.2d 1042 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
Columbia Parcar Corp. v. Arizona Department of Transportation 971 P.2d 1042 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
Ordinarily, “each word, phrase, clause, and sentence [of a statute] must be given meaning so that no part of the statute will be void, inert, redundant, or trivial.”
Bothell v. Two Point Acres, Inc. 965 P.2d 47 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1998
Bothell v. Two Point Acres, Inc. 965 P.2d 47 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1998
Arizona Department of Revenue v. Superior Court 938 P.2d 98 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
Arizona Department of Revenue v. Superior Court 938 P.2d 98 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
In interpreting statutes “each word, phrase, clause, and sentence must be given meaning so that no part of the statute will be void, redundant, or trivial.” , (interpreting phrase in recreational users statute).
Prince v. City of Apache Junction 912 P.2d 47 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1996
Prince v. City of Apache Junction 912 P.2d 47 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1996
Special Fund Division v. Industrial Commission 909 P.2d 430 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
Followed Special Fund Division v. Industrial Commission 909 P.2d 430 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
Schuff Steel Co., 181 Ariz. at 446, 891 P.2d at 913 (“To interpret this requirement as Argonaut sug *368 gests, however, totally eviscerates the written records requirement.”); , (court must give meaning to each component of statute so that no part of statute becomes void, inert, redundant, or trivial).
Ward v. State 890 P.2d 1144 Ariz. 1995
Ward v. State 890 P.2d 1144 Ariz. 1995
Jim Ratliff), cited in Stramka, 179 Ariz. at 285 , 877 P.2d at 1342
State v. Valdez 894 P.2d 708 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
State v. Valdez 894 P.2d 708 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
Matter of Appeal in Maricopa County 887 P.2d 599 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
Matter of Appeal in Maricopa County 887 P.2d 599 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
“Reasonable” in this context must mean something more than “legitimate” or “lawful.” , , (“[E]ach word ...
Sonitrol of Maricopa County v. City of Phoenix 891 P.2d 880 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
Sonitrol of Maricopa County v. City of Phoenix 891 P.2d 880 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
Stramka v. Salt River Recreation, Inc. 877 P.2d 1339 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
Stramka v. Salt River Recreation, Inc. 877 P.2d 1339 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
State v. Pitts 874 P.2d 962 Ariz. 1994
State v. Pitts 874 P.2d 962 Ariz. 1994
Ward v. State 871 P.2d 711 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
Ward v. State 871 P.2d 711 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
They note that the legislature was concerned with promoting the use of “vast areas of land not now being used for recreational purposes.”
Newman v. Sun Valley Crushing Co. 844 P.2d 623 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
Newman v. Sun Valley Crushing Co. 844 P.2d 623 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
the court discussed the legislative history of the statute and its purpose.
Barry v. Alberty 843 P.2d 1279 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
Barry v. Alberty 843 P.2d 1279 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
Hauskins v. McGillicuddy 852 P.2d 1226 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
Hauskins v. McGillicuddy 852 P.2d 1226 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
Arizona Dept. of Public Safety v. Industrial Commission 823 P.2d 1283 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
Bledsoe v. Goodfarb 823 P.2d 1264 Ariz. 1991
Bledsoe v. Goodfarb 823 P.2d 1264 Ariz. 1991
5 The court of appeals addressed the statutory definition of “premises” , (greenbelt area, passing through a planned residential neighborhood, was not covered under the statute).
In Re the Appeal in Maricopa County, Juvenile Action No. JA 33794 828 P.2d 1231 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1991