Cited by

–37 ¶ 7 (Ariz. App. 2025) (explaining that courts may exercise discretion on whether to address waived arguments on appeal because waiver is procedural, not jurisdictional)

¶7 While the general rule is that an issue not raised before the trial court is waived on appeal, see, “neither Trantor nor its progeny has created an unalterable rule of waiver,” ¶ 16 (App. 2009); (noting waiver rule “is procedural, not jurisdictional”).

See id.; (court will not read into statute something not within manifest intent of legislature as indicated by statute itself); (court will not “inflate, expand, stretch or extend” statute to matters not within expressed provisions).

(court “will not read into a statute something which is not within the manifest intent of the legislature as indicated by the statute itself.”).

“[W]e will not read into a statute something which is not within the manifest intent of the legislature as indicated by the statute itself.”

(“As a rule, arguments not made at the trial court cannot be asserted on appeal.”).

(Whether a litigant can raise on appeal an argument not made in the superior court is procedural, not jurisdictional, and may be suspended at the appellate court’s discretion.).

(Whether a litigant can raise on appeal an argument not made in the superior court is procedural, not jurisdictional, and may be suspended at the appellate court’s discretion.).

(In a civil case, whether a litigant can raise on appeal an 6 BALL v. BALL Opinion of the Court argument not made in the superior court is procedural, not jurisdictional, and may be suspended at the ap

("[A]rguments not made at the trial court cannot be asserted on appeal.").

We will not read into a statute anything not within the clear intent of the legislature as indicated by the statute itself, nor will we “inflate, expand, stretch[,] or extend a statute to matters not falling within its express provisions.” ().

(App. 2 The superior court's second finding on remand resolved a dispute relating to the timeliness of the Yards' challenge to the deeds Perkins offered under § 12-1103(B).

(“arguments not made at the trial court cannot be asserted on appeal”); (specific objection is required in trial court to give court opportunity to “correct any asserted defects” before appellant claims error on review).

Sec., ¶¶ 17–18 (App. 2011) (choosing to analyze 4 GILA RIVER, DESTINY O. v. DCS, et al. Opinion of the Court standard of proof for “active efforts” under ICWA, notwithstanding appellant’s failure to raise issue in juvenile court); (tenet that argument not made in trial court cannot be asserted on appeal is procedural, not jurisdictional, and may be suspended at appellate court’s discretion).

See, e.g., Smith, , ; , Harden v. Superior Court, 44 Cal.2d 630

n.5, ¶ 15, n.5 (App. 2005) ( ).

¶ 14, (stating that the court “will not read into a statute something which is not within the manifest intent of the legislature as indicated by the statute itself” ( (internal quotation marks omitted))).

Co., (“[W]e will not read into a statute something which is not within the manifest intent of the legislature as indicated by the statute itself.”).

We “will not read into a statute something which is not within the manifest intent of the legislature as indicated by the statute itself.”

Using its police powers, “a municipality may abate a nuisance without compensating the owner of the property.” , see also Moton, 100 Ariz. at 27-28 , 410 P.2d at 95-96 (“In the absence of a statutory provision for compensation, private property may be destroyed by a municipal corporation without compensation to the owner where the destruction is necessary to protect the public and the municipalit

And “arguments not made at the trial court cannot be asserted on appeal.”

( , ("We may review issues not raised in the trial court when `the record contains facts determinative of an issue which will resolve the action, ...