Cited by

as triers of fact”); (“Whether a reasonable person would believe a pool was an open and obvious hazard .

–56 (1985) (whether a danger is open and obvious is a question of breach, not duty); Tribe v. Shell Oil Co., Inc., (whether a danger is open and obvious is a fact question “to 11 PEREZ v. CIRCLE K Howe, J., Concurring be decided by a jury”); (whether a pool is an open and obvious danger to a child “is a question that relates to the breach of duty, not its existence”); (because duty was established, whether a pool was an unreasonably dangerous condition was a fact question that could not be de

¶8 Rosales argues there was an issue of fact as to whether the cables were open and obvious, in which we held that whether a pool was an open and obvious hazard to a child was a question of fact for the jury.

–61 (App. 1991) (“Motions for summary judgment should not be denied ‘simply on the speculation that some slight doubt .

v. Reeves, (noting evidence that may provide a “scintilla” or create the “slightest doubt” is not sufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment); -61 (App. 1991) (a motion for summary judgment should not be denied simply upon speculation that some doubt, scintilla of evidence, or dispute over irrelevant or immaterial facts “might blossom into a real controversy in the midst of trial” (quoting Orme Sch., 166 Ariz. at 311)).4 4 This case is theref

Moreover, a motion for summary judgment should not be denied simply upon speculation that some doubt, scintilla of evidence, or dispute over irrelevant or immaterial facts “might blossom into a real controversy in the midst of trial.” -61 (App. 1991) (quoting Orme Sch., 166 Ariz. at 311).

Orme Sch., 166 Ariz. at 309, 802 P.2d at 1008; 563, 224 (App. 1991).

(“Summary judgment is inappropriate where the facts, even if undisputed, would allow reasonable minds to differ.”); (although facts related to child’s near drowning were largely undisputed, summary judgment reversed in negligence action because pool’s dangerousness, parents’ level of responsibility, and reasonableness of homeowners’ conduct were factors to be weighed by jury).

While summary judgment is inappropriate if the trial court must choose between conflicting inferences, , we find insufficient support in the record for appellants' inference that the city exercised joint control over traffic signal decisions or installations on the highway.

-67, -28 (App.1991), plaintiff urges this court to abandon the distinction between invitees and social guests/licensees.

(Fidel, J., specially concurring); Moore v. Tucson Elec.