Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Rourk v. State, 821 P.2d 273.

27 citing documents.

RODRIGUEZ v. OPENDOOR Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2026
(“An ‘intermediate order’ is one made between commencement of the action and final judgment, which is not separately appealable.”).
SHUMATE v. DAVIS/BROADBENT Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2026
(“An ‘intermediate order’ is one made between commencement of the action and final judgment, which is not separately appealable.”).
Federal Insurance v. Skyquest Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2023
Federal Insurance v. Skyquest Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2023
That provision provides that the court “shall review any intermediate order involving the merits of the action and necessarily affecting the judgment.” An intermediate order is one “made between commencement of the action and final judgment, which is not separately appealable.”
State v. Palmer Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
Triyar v. Rem Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
Triyar v. Rem Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
-13 (App. 1991) (citations omitted).
State of Arizona v. Robert Leeroy Slover Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
State of Arizona v. Robert Leeroy Slover Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
(finding accident caused by intoxicated driver part of foreseeable chain of events even though exact details of driver’s conduct not foreseeable); (other driver exceeding speed limit not superseding caus
City of Phoenix v. Mangum 912 P.2d 35 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
City of Phoenix v. Mangum 912 P.2d 35 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
Little v. ALL PHOENIX S. COM. MENT. HLTH. 919 P.2d 1368 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1996
Little v. ALL PHOENIX S. COM. MENT. HLTH. 919 P.2d 1368 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1996
State v. Wilson 914 P.2d 1346 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
State v. Wilson 914 P.2d 1346 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
Little v. All Phoenix South Community Mental Health Center, Inc. 919 P.2d 1368 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1995
Little v. All Phoenix South Community Mental Health Center, Inc. 919 P.2d 1368 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1995
“A directed verdict is proper if reasonable minds could not differ on the inferences or conclusions that could be drawn from the evidence, and the party for whom it is granted is entitled to judgment as *101 a matter of law.” , , 276 (App.1991).
Broadbent v. Broadbent 907 P.2d 43 Ariz. 1995
Broadbent v. Broadbent 907 P.2d 43 Ariz. 1995
ope of his employment; if the parent acts willfully, wantonly, or recklessly; if the child is emancipated; if the child or parent dies; if a third party is liable for the tort, then the immunity of the parent does not protect that third party; and if the tortfeasor is standing in loco parentis, such as a grandparent, foster parent, or teacher, then the immunity does not apply, -11 , -78 (App.1991) (holding that doctrine of parental immunity did not apply to foster parents).
Smith v. Johnson 899 P.2d 199 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
Smith v. Johnson 899 P.2d 199 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
Haynes v. Syntek Finance Corp. 909 P.2d 399 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
Haynes v. Syntek Finance Corp. 909 P.2d 399 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
Williams v. Thude 885 P.2d 1096 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
Williams v. Thude 885 P.2d 1096 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
that where the appeal is from the underlying judgment and the order denying the motion for new trial, the appeal is not limited to issues raised in the motion for new trial.
BROADBENT BY BROADBENT v. Broadbent 870 P.2d 1149 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
BROADBENT BY BROADBENT v. Broadbent 870 P.2d 1149 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994