Cited by

(“[W]hen we are considering the interpretation and application of statutes, we do not believe we can be limited to the arguments made by the parties if that would cause us to reach an incorrect result.”); see also Est. of Hernandez v. Ariz. Bd.

“If application of a legal principle, even if not raised below, would dispose of an action on appeal and correctly explain the law, it is appropriate for [the appellate court] to consider the issue.” 4 GARSHA v. HILL Decision of the Court (App. 1993).

We have also said that if “application of a legal principle, even if not raised below, would dispose of an action on appeal 5 PHILLIP B. v. ADCS/FAUST Opinion of the Court and correctly explain the law, it is appropriate for us to consider the issue.”

See Jimenez, 183 Ariz. at 406; ¶ 23 (App. 2018) (considering an issue first raised on appeal when the opposing party was “afforded the opportunity to, and did in fact, respond to [the waived issue] in its answering brief”); n.2 (App. 1993) (addressing a new issue after affording both sides an opportunity to file supplemental briefs on the issue).

ve discretion to address a significant, albeit waived, issue.” ¶ 7, n.2 (App. 2010); ¶ 47, n.8 (App. 2009) (“If application of a legal principle, even if not raised below, would dispose of an action on appeal and correctly explain the law, it is appropriate for us to consider the issue.”) ().

¶18 in which we held § 12-820.01 immunized the State from a claim that the Department of Transportation Motor Vehicle Division should have implemented procedures to identify driver's license applicants with known drinking problems.

See Normandin, 245 Ariz. at 72, ¶ 12 (argument was not waived where it presented a question of law and the superior court considered it); (“If application of a legal principle, even if not raised below, would dispose of an action on appeal and correctly explain the law, it is appropriate for us to consider the issue.”).

Additionally, “when we are considering the interpretation and application of statutes, we do not believe we can be limited to the arguments made by the parties if that would cause us to reach an incorrect result.” ().

(quoting Evenstad v. State , , 582, , 815 (App. 1993) ) ).

Moreover, we have discretion to consider even a waived issue if it is an issue of law, such as an interpretation of a statute, see Searchtoppers.com, ¶ 8 (App. 2012), and its consideration “would dispose of an action on appeal and correctly explain the law,” (“[W]hen we are considering the interpretation and application of statutes, we do not believe we can be limited to the arguments made by the parties if that would cause us to reach an incorrect result.”).

However, “[i]f application of a legal principle, even if not raised below, would dispose of an action on appeal and correctly explain the law, it is appropriate for us to consider the issue.”

See id.; n.2, n.2 (App. 2005) (courts are not “limited to the arguments made by the parties if that would [lead to] an incorrect result”) ( ).

See Hansen, 215 Ariz. at 289, ¶ 7, 160 P.3d at 168 (“Rules and statutes ‘should be harmonized wherever possible and read in conjunction with each other.’”) (citation omitted); (“[W]hen we are considering the interpretation and application of statutes, we do not believe we can be limited to the arguments made by the parties if that would cause us to reach an incorrect result.”).

“[W]hen we are considering the interpretation and application of statutes, we do not believe we can be limited to the arguments made by the parties if that would cause us to reach an incorrect result.”

ter of law even though not presented to trial court); n.8, 1145 n.8 (App. 2009) (“‘If application of a legal principle, even if not raised below, would dispose of an action on appeal and correctly explain the law, it is appropriate for us to consider the issue.’”), (alterations in Payne omitted).

4 1998), “[i]f application of a legal principle, even if not raised below, would dispose of an action on appeal and correctly explain the law, it is appropriate for us to consider the issue,” see also Michael M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ.

(“[W]hen we are considering the interpretation and application of statutes, we do not believe we can be limited to the arguments made by the parties if that would cause us to reach an incorrect result.”).

Smith, , (appellate court may address argument otherwise waived); n. 8 , , 1145 n. 8 (App.2009) ('“If application of a legal principle, even if not raised below, would dispose of an action on appeal and correctly explain the law, it is appropriate for us to consider the issue.’ ”), , n. 4 , , 687 n. 4 (App.2008) (exercising discretion to address issues first raised in reply brief).

(App.2005) (“[W]aiver is a procedural concept that courts do not rigidly employ in mechanical fashion.”); n. 8 , , 1145 n. 8 (App.2009) (“ ‘If application of a legal principle, even if not raised below, would dispose of an action on appeal and correctly explain the law, it is appropriate for us to consider the issue.’ ”), , , (appellate court may address argument otherwise waived); n. 4 , , 687 n. 4 (App.2008) (exercising discretion to address issues first raised in reply brief).

8 n. 6 ¶ 23, , 762 n. 6 (App.2006) ( , ).

v. State, , see abo Home Builders Ass'n, n. 3 , 158 P.3d at 874 n. 3 (when "interpreting a statute, we are not bound by [a party’s] waiver” by failure to raise the argument below).

But, “[i]f application of a legal principle, even if not raised below, would dispose of an action on appeal and correctly explain the law, it is appropriate for us to consider the issue.” see also Home Builders Ass’n, n.3, 158 P.3d at 874 n.3 (when “interpreting a statute, we are not bound by [a party’s] waiver” by failure to raise the argument below).