Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Tellez v. Saban, 933 P.2d 1233.

38 citing documents.

  • KAUFMAN v. GUEVARA Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
  • KAUFMAN v. GUEVARA Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
    A “court may derive a standard of care from a statute ‘if it first determines that the statute’s purpose is in part to protect a class of persons that includes the plaintiff and the specific interest at issue from the type of harm that occurred and against the particular action that caused the harm.’” Martin, 209 Ariz. at 536, ¶ 23 ().
  • Robin Roebuck v. Mayo Clinic Ariz. 2025
  • Robin Roebuck v. Mayo Clinic Ariz. 2025
    ¶ 18 (App. 2016) (“The standard of care may be ‘established by a legislative enactment.’” ()); see Restatement § 285.
  • Wing v. U-Haul Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
  • Wing v. U-Haul Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
    ¶14 Negligent conduct “falls below the standard established by law” to protect “others against unreasonable risk of harm.”
  • St. George v. Plimpton 384 P.3d 1243 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
  • St. George v. Plimpton 384 P.3d 1243 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
    ¶18 The standard of care may be “established by a legislative enactment” or “adopted by the court from a legislative enactment.” (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 285, at 20 (1965)).
  • Moore v. Parham Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
  • Moore v. Parham Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
    at 253, ¶ 23, 293 P.3d at 529 ( ).
  • Sullivan v. Pulte Home Corp. 354 P.3d 424 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
  • Sullivan v. Pulte Home Corp. 354 P.3d 424 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
    (rejecting negligence per se claim based on statute prohibiting rental car company from leasing to unlicensed drivers because “statutes intended for the protection of the public at large rather than an individual or class of persons do not create the standard of conduct required o
  • Doyle v. Bashas Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
  • Doyle v. Bashas Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
    Further, a reasonably foreseeable event is one that “might reasonably be expected to occur now and then, and would be recognized as not highly unlikely if it did suggest itself to the actor’s mind.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
  • McMurtry v. Weatherford Hotel, Inc. 293 P.3d 520 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2013
  • McMurtry v. Weatherford Hotel, Inc. 293 P.3d 520 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2013
    “A reasonably foreseeable event is one that might ‘reasonably be expected to occur now and then, and would be recognized as not highly unlikely if it did suggest itself to the actor’s mind.’” , (citation omitted).
  • STATE EX REL. GODDARD v. Ochoa 228 P.3d 950 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
  • STATE EX REL. GODDARD v. Ochoa 228 P.3d 950 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
    However, the rule is not jurisdictional, and this court has discretion to consider a new argument on appeal when the issue is one of statewide importance, Winsor v. Glasswerks PHX, L.L.C., n. 3, ¶ 20 , n. 3 (App.2003), or if adoption of a legal principle “will expedite enforcement of a right or redress an injustice.” n. 3 , n. 3 (App.1996).
  • Ritchie v. Krasner 211 P.3d 1272 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
  • Ritchie v. Krasner 211 P.3d 1272 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
    at 243, ¶ 34 , 129 P.3d at 965 ( , ).
  • Gipson v. Kasey 129 P.3d 957 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2006
  • Gipson v. Kasey 129 P.3d 957 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2006
    3 “The ‘definition of a reasonably foreseeable event is an event that might reasonably be expected to occur now and then, and would be recognized as not highly unlikely if it did suggest itself to the actor’s mind.’” , (quoting W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 44, at 307 (5th ed.1984)).
  • Acuna v. Hampton And Kroack Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2006
  • Acuna v. Hampton And Kroack Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2006
    We 7 (tort of negligent entrustment not restricted “to cases in which the owner entrusts a vehicle to one known to be incompetent or inexperienced,” but also applies when “‘the peculiar circumstances of the case are such as to give the actor good reason to believe that the third person
  • Martin v. Schroeder 105 P.3d 577 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2005
  • Martin v. Schroeder 105 P.3d 577 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2005
    The court may derive a standard of care from a statute “if it first determines that the statute’s purpose is in part to protect a class of persons that includes the plaintiff and the specific interest at issue from the type of harm that occurred and against the particular action that caused the harm.” , see also Estate of Hernandez v. Ariz. Bd.
  • State v. Munninger 104 P.3d 204 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
  • State v. Munninger 104 P.3d 204 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
    of Supervisors of Pima Co., , , 171 n. 3, , 1239 n. 3 (App.1996).
  • Milner v. Colonial Trust Co. 6 P.3d 329 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
  • Milner v. Colonial Trust Co. 6 P.3d 329 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
  • Dickey v. City of Flagstaff 4 P.3d 965 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
  • Dickey v. City of Flagstaff 4 P.3d 965 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
  • Hill v. Safford Unified School District 952 P.2d 754 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1997
  • Hill v. Safford Unified School District 952 P.2d 754 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1997
    A reasonably foreseeable event is one that might “reasonably be expected to occur now and then, and would be recognized as not highly unlikely if it did suggest itself to the actor’s mind.” , see Fazzolari v. Portland School District No. 1J, 78 Or.App.
  • Knauss v. DND Neffson Co. 963 P.2d 271 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1997
  • Knauss v. DND Neffson Co. 963 P.2d 271 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1997
    Petolicchio v. Santa Cruz County Fair & Rodeo Ass’n, , Markowitz, 146 Ariz. at 357 , 706 P.2d at 369 (“The test for whether conduct is negligent is whether there is a foreseeable risk of injury from the conduct.”); , , 172 n. 5, , 1240 n. 5 (App.1996) (“Foreseeability of risk plays a dual role in negligence: it not only defines the standard of care but also determines whether an actor’s conduct was the proximate cause of the injury.”).
  • Souza v. Fred Carries Contracts, Inc. 955 P.2d 3 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1997
  • Souza v. Fred Carries Contracts, Inc. 955 P.2d 3 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1997
    In addition, to be a proximate cause of the accident, FCCI’s conduct “need have contributed only slightly to the injury.” , , (App.1996)