Cited by

Newspapers, Inc. v. Dep’t of Corr., ).

Newspapers, Inc. v. Dep’t of Corr., (citing cases).

Co., ¶ 13 (App. 1998) (citing Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Dep’t of Corr., –44 (App. 1997)).

Newspapers, Inc. v. Dep’t of Corr., (construing prior version of A.R.S.

Newspapers, Inc. v. Dep’t of Corr., –44 (App. 1997).

Newspapers, Inc. v. Dep’t of Corrs.

“We view the evidence in a manner most favorable to sustaining the award and affirm unless the trial court’s finding that the action can be so characterized is clearly erroneous.” Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Dep’t of Corr.

Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Dep’t of Corrs.

Newspapers, Inc. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Corr., -44 (App. 1997), we have affirmed the award of sanctions under subsection (A)(3) under circumstances similar to those presented here, ¶¶ 31-32 (App. 2010) (affirming sanctions under § 12-349(A)(3) when failure to disclose expert witness resulted in mistrial and required new tri

Newspapers, Inc. v. Dep’t of Corr., (construing an earlier, similar, version of § 12-349).

See Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Dep’t of Corrs., (claim preclusion applies if “no additional evidence is needed to prevail in the second action than that needed in the first”); –33, ¶ 9 (App. 2008) (father’s action was “an attempt to relitigate one of the same matters necessarily adjudicated in Mother’s d

Newspapers, Inc. v. Dep’t of Corr.

Newspapers, Inc. v. Dep’t of Corr., (burden on proponent).

Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Dep’t of Corr., –44 (App. 1997).

§ 12-349 de novo, but we view “the evidence in a manner most favorable to sustaining the award” and will affirm unless the superior court’s findings are “clearly erroneous.”5 Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Dep’t of Corr., 244 (App. 1997).

See Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Dep’t of Corr., 244 (App.1997); ¶ 27 (App. 2001).3 ¶37 The trial court found that, based on the record, it could not make the necessary findings of fact to support an award under § 12-349.

See Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Dep’t of Corrs., (claim preclusion applies only if “no additional evidence is needed to prevail in the second action than that needed in the first”).

Newspapers, Inc. v. Dep’t of Corr.

We do not need to examine whether the claims or issues “aris[e] out of the same nucleus of operative facts,” or whether “additional evidence is needed to prevail in the second action than that needed in the first,” Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Dep’t of Corr., because under similar circumstances nearly a century ago, our supreme court held ‘‘[t]he estoppel extends only to the exact point raised by the pleadings and decided, and does not operate as a bar to a second suit on other claims or issues,

Father argues the application included impermissible billing for services not relevant to the proceedings at issue, high billing rates, and “block-billing.” “When reviewing a discretionary award of attorneys’ fees, this Court will reverse only for an abuse of discretion.” Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Dep’t of Corr.

Newspapers, Inc. v. Dep’t of Corr.

§ 12-349 de novo, but in so doing, we view “the evidence in a manner most favorable to sustaining the award” and affirm unless the superior court’s findings are “clearly erroneous.” Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Dep’t of Corr., –44, ¶ 7 (App. 1997).

See Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Dep’t of Corrs.

Citing this court’s decision in Phoenix Newspapers, Father argues the proper legal standard for deciding whether an “identity of claims” exists between the two proceedings is the “transactional approach.” In that case, however, we merely recognized that most federal circuit courts follow the transactional test, which precludes a second action if it “could

Newspapers, Inc. v. Dep’t of Corr., (“We presume that the legislature does not enact superfluous or reiterative legislation.”).