Cited by

See Falcone Bros. & Assocs., (“It is 5 IN RE GUARDIANSHIP OF C.M.

Exam’rs, ¶ 25 n.7 (App. 1999).

See, e.g., Dickey, 205 Ariz. at 3 ¶ 9; Cronin, 195 Ariz. at 538–39 ¶ 35; ¶ 17 (1999); Humana Hosp.

at ¶ 9 n.3; see also Lerner v. DMB Realty, LLC, ¶ 41 (App. 2014) (“We therefore hold that, like the wrongful termination claim in Cronin, the Lerners’ claim for negligent failure to disclose is not protected by the anti-abrogation clause.”); -07, ¶ 18 (App. 1999) (“It is not enough, as Goodman attempts here, to append to the asserted claim a name derived from the catalogue of common law actions.

Exam’rs, ¶ 25 n.7 (App. 1999)).

Exam’rs, ¶ 25 n.7 (App. 1999).

Id.; ¶ 27 (App. 1999) (“If effective peer review is to be achieved, and the statutory goal [of reducing morbidity and mortality and improving patient care] realized, peer reviewers and their hospitals must have some protection against money damage claims.”).

Augustine Const. Co., (“We will not reach a constitutional question if a case can be fairly decided on nonconstitutional grounds.”); ¶ 11 (App. 1999) (“It is sound judicial policy to avoid deciding a case on constitutional grounds if there are nonconstitutional grounds dispositive of the case.”).

¶ 11 (App. 1999) (“It is sound judicial policy to avoid deciding a case on constitutional grounds if there are nonconstitutional grounds dispositive of the case.”).

¶ 23 (App. 2010) (alteration in original) ( ¶ 11 (App. 1999) (because the applicability of an immunity statute, which could have resolved the case on nonconstitutional grounds, was not before the Goodman court, the court addressed constitutional arguments)).

Exam’rs, n.7, ¶ 25 (App. 1999); (Courts are not “required to perform counsel’s work by searching the record to attempt to discover facts which establish or defeat the [summary judgment] motion.”).

We need not address Safarian’s constitutional argument because “there are nonconstitutional grounds dispositive of the case.” 4 ¶ 11 (App. 1999) (citing Petolicchio v. Santa Cruz Cnty.

See, ¶ 11 , (“It is sound judicial policy to avoid deciding a ease on constitutional grounds if there are noneonstitutional grounds dispositive of the ease.”).

(claim for negligent peer review by hospital not protected because not recognized at common law).

("It is sound judicial policy to avoid deciding a case on constitutional grounds if there are nonconstitutional grounds dispositive of the case."); see also R.L.

Exam’rs, , (citations omitted), , 508 n. 7, ¶ 25, , 1067 n. 7 (App.1999)).

Exam’rs, , ("In ruling upon motions for summary judgment, the trial court is required to consider only those portions of the record which are brought to its attention by the parties.”), , 508 n. 7, ¶ 25, , 1067 n. 7 (App.1999); , ("In light of the volume and complexity of modern litigation, we consider the cases requiring a trial court or an appellate court to search the entire record in connection with a motion for summa

Exam’rs, , (citation omitted), , 508 n. 7, ¶ 25, , 1067 n. 7 (App.1999); see also Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 , 99 S.Ct.

-10, n. 10 , , 1068-69 n. 10 (App. 1999) (purported violations of federal and state Equal Protection clauses are analyzed identically); -45, ¶ 12 , -61 (App.2001) (federal and state guarantees of due process are similar, if not identical).

Laws, ch. 119, § 1; Gilbert v. Bd.

¶ 11 , (“It is sound judicial policy to avoid deciding a case on constitutional grounds if there are noneonstitutional grounds dispositive of the case.”).

¶ 11 , (“It is sound judicial policy to avoid deciding a case on constitutional grounds if there are noneonstitutional grounds dispositive of the case.”).