State v. Lujan

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

DANIEL SALAS LUJAN, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 22-0010
FILED 7-20-2023

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2019-129194-001
The Honorable Eartha K. Washington, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson
By Diane L. Hunt
Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix
By Robert W. Doyle
Counsel for Appellant
 STATE v. LUJAN
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Angela K. Paton delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Michael J. Brown and Judge Andrew M. Jacobs joined.

P A T O N, Judge:

¶1 Daniel Salas Lujan appeals his convictions for criminal
trespass and resisting arrest. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 One night in June 2019, employees at Monroe Bar, located on
the first floor of the U.S. Bank Tower building, called building security and
reported that Lujan “was sticking around the bar when he wasn’t wanted”
and was “refusing to leave.” A security guard approached Lujan and asked
him to leave, but Lujan refused and insisted he owned the building. The
security guard confirmed that Lujan did not own the building before calling
the police and asking them to escort Lujan from the building. When police
arrived, Lujan told them he was not “willing to leave the premises
peacefully” and resisted the officers’ efforts to detain him for trespassing.

¶3 A jury convicted Lujan of criminal trespass and resisting
arrest. Lujan timely appeals. We have jurisdiction under Article 6, Section
9, of the Arizona Constitution and Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”)
Section 13-4033(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

I. The superior court did not err by denying Lujan’s motion for a
directed verdict on his criminal trespass charge.

¶4 Lujan argues the superior court erred by denying his motion
for a directed verdict on the criminal trespass charge because the State
presented no evidence that the security guard who asked Lujan to leave the
building had “lawful control” over the building as required by Section
13-1502.

¶5 After the close of evidence in a criminal trial, the superior
court “must enter a judgment of acquittal on any offense charged” unless
there is “substantial evidence to support a conviction.” Ariz. R. Crim. P.

2
 STATE v. LUJAN
Decision of the Court

20(a)(1). We review de novo whether substantial evidence existed to
support a conviction, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to
supporting the verdict. State v. West, 226 Ariz. 559, 562, ¶ 15 (2011).
Evidence may be direct or circumstantial, and if reasonable minds can differ
on the inferences to be drawn from the evidence, “the case must be
submitted to the jury” and the court “has no discretion to enter a judgment
of acquittal.” State v. Landrigan, 176 Ariz. 1, 4 (1993).

¶6 “A person commits criminal trespass in the third degree by[]
[k]nowingly entering or remaining unlawfully on any real property after a
reasonable request to leave by a law enforcement officer, the owner or any
other person having lawful control over such property, or reasonable notice
prohibiting entry.” A.R.S. § 13-1502(A)(1).

¶7 The State presented sufficient evidence that the security
guard who requested Lujan leave the building had “lawful control” over
the building, as the criminal trespass statute requires. The security guard
testified that he worked at the U.S. Bank Tower and his job was to “secure
the building[.]” He testified that bar employees told him that Lujan
“needed to leave.” He also testified that he asked Lujan to leave the
building more than fifteen times and that Lujan “refused” each time. This
evidence was sufficient for a jury to find that Lujan stayed in the building
despite being told to leave by a person with lawful control over the
property. Thus, substantial evidence supported the trespass conviction,
and the court did not err by denying Lujan’s Rule 20(a) motion.

II. The superior court did not commit prejudicial, fundamental error
by not defining “enter or remain unlawfully” in the jury
instructions for criminal trespass.

¶8 Lujan argues the superior court erred by failing to instruct the
jury on the statutory definition of “enter or remain unlawfully” as it relates
to criminal trespass. Because Lujan failed to object to the jury instructions
at trial, we review only for fundamental error. See State v. Velazquez, 216
Ariz. 300, 309–10, ¶ 37 (2007).

¶9 Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 21.3(b) provides that
“[a]ny objection to the court’s giving or failing to give any instruction or a
portion of an instruction . . . must be made before the jury retires to consider
its verdict” and “[t]he objection must be on the record and distinctly state
the matter to which the party objects and the grounds for the objection.”

¶10 At trial, Lujan and the State both proposed jury instructions,
but only the State requested an instruction on the statutory definition of

3
 STATE v. LUJAN
Decision of the Court

“enter or remain unlawfully.” Lujan only asked the court to instruct the
jury on the definitions of “knowingly” and of “aggravated assault.” The
court adopted Lujan’s proposal and instructed the jury, in relevant part,
that “the crime of criminal trespass means a person knowingly did enter or
remain unlawfully in or on the non-residential structure of another.” The
court did not include the statutory definition of “enter or remain
unlawfully.”

¶11 Our supreme court has held that superior courts “do not
commit fundamental error” by failing to provide the jury with the
“definitions of words whose legal and ordinary meanings overlap.” See
State v. Harris, 151 Ariz. 236, 238–39 (1986); State v. Barnett, 142 Ariz. 592,
594–95 (1984) (holding that superior court did not commit fundamental
error by not sua sponte defining “intentionally” as used in jury instructions
because the statutory definition and “ordinary definition” of the term are
“essentially the same.”).

¶12 The statutory definition of “enter or remain unlawfully” is
essentially the same as the phrase’s ordinary meaning. Indeed, Section
13-1501 provides that a person’s entry into a structure is unlawful when his
“intent” for entering or remaining is “not licensed, authorized or otherwise
privileged.” See also Rev. Ariz. Jury Instr. (“RAJI”) Stat. Crim. 15.01(2) (4th
ed. 2016) (providing statutory definition for “enter or remain unlawfully”).
“Unlawful” is defined as “illegal: not according to or authorized by law; not
sanctioned by official rules.” Unlawful and Illegal, Merriam-Webster’s
Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2020). Accordingly, even if the superior
court erred by failing to define “enter or remain unlawfully,” the error was
not fundamental because the statutory definition unlawful overlaps with
the term’s common meaning. We find no prejudicial, fundamental error.

CONCLUSION

¶13 We affirm.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AA

4