Cited by

requires nothing more than an adequate opportunity to fully present factual and legal claims.” ¶ 16 (App. 1999).

requires nothing more than an adequate opportunity to fully present factual and legal claims.” ¶ 16 (App. 1999).

See id.; see also Trantor, 179 Ariz. at 300; ¶ 8 (2008) (“The denial of receipt of mail creates an issue of fact that the factfinder must resolve to determine if delivery actually occurred.”); ¶ 26 (App. 1999) (noting the reviewing court is “not the appropriate forum for resolving factual disputes” and thus the appellate court will not consider new evidence on appeal, assuming new evidence has been offered.).

at 549 ¶ 11 ( ¶ 16 (App. 1999)); ¶¶ 48–50 (2006) (to same effect).

Hidalgo also argues that parties must be permitted to develop both the law and the facts, ¶ 16

However, because “[t]his court is not the appropriate forum for resolving factual disputes,” ¶ 26, we will not consider the new evidence.

¶ 19 (App. 1999) (generally we do not consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal); see also Benitez v. Indus.

See Kessen 4 KARRY v. VEOLIA/ ¶ 19

“The best indicator of legislative intent is the plain language of the statute,” id., and “we will give terms ‘their ordinary meanings, unless the legislature has provided a specific definition or the context of the statute indicates a term carries a special meaning.’”

Even assuming the County was deprived of its due process right to notice and an adequate opportunity to present its claims, ¶ 16 , because it fails to demonstrate how it was unreasonably prejudiced by the deprivation, we do not find reversible error.

Servs., -54, ¶ 16 , -04 (App.2002) (utilizing common dictionary definitions when no statutory definition is provided); Circle K *85 Stores, ¶ 18 , (“By declining to define a statutory term, the legislature generally intends to give the ordinary meaning to the word.”) ( ¶ 6 , ).

§ 1-213 (2002); see also Circle K Stores, ¶ 18 , ("By declining to define a statutory term, the legislature generally intends to give the ordinary meaning to the word.") ( ¶ 6 , ).

§ 1-213 (2002); see also Circle K. Stores, ¶ 18 , (“By declining to define a statutory term, the legislature generally intends to give the ordinary meaning to the word.” ( ¶ 6 , )).

“Statutory language is the best indicator of that intent and we will give terms ‘their ordinary meanings, unless the legislature has provided a specific definition or the context of the statute indicates a term carries a special meaning.’” -92 (App. 1999)

Statutory language is the best indicator of that intent and we will give terms their ordinary meanings, unless the legislature has provided a specific definition____” -91, ¶ 6 , -92 (App.1999) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

"Statutory language is the best indicator of that intent and we will give terms `their ordinary meanings, unless the legislature has provided a specific definition or the context of the statute indicates a term carries a special meaning.'"

¶ 6 , (“[W]e will give terms ‘their ordinary meanings, uniess the legislature has provided a specific definition or the context of the statute indicates a term carries a special meaning.’”) ( , (App.1

See Kessen v. Industrial Comm’n, ¶ 19 , (citing Phoenix Children’s Hosp.