Cited by

Crystal E. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 4 (App. 2017).

¶ 6 (App. 2017) (appellate review generally limited to specific issues raised by the appellant).

See Crystal E. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 6 (App. 2017) (“[W]e adhere to the policy that it is generally not our role to sua sponte address issues not raised by the appellant.”); Christina G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ.

see also Crystal E. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, -78, ¶¶ 5-6 (App. 2017) (“[W]e adhere to the policy that it is generally not our role to sua sponte address issues not raised by the appellant.”); Christina G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ.

See Crystal E. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 5 (App. 2017).

See ARCAP 13(a) (requiring appellant’s brief contain a statement of issues for review, supporting legal authority, references to the record, and reasons for each contention); Crystal E. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 6 (App. 2017) (“[W]e adhere to the policy that it is generally not our role to sua sponte address issues not raised by the appellant.”); Christina G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ.

See ARCAP 13(a) (requiring appellant’s brief contain a statement of issues for review, supporting legal authority, references to the record, and reasons for each contention); Crystal E. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 6 (App. 2017) (“[W]e adhere to the policy that it is generally not our role to sua sponte address issues not raised by the appellant.”); Christina G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ.

See ARCAP 13(a) (requiring appellant’s brief contain a statement of issues for review, supporting legal authority, references to the record, and reasons for each contention); Crystal E. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 6 (App. 2017) (“[W]e adhere to the policy that it is generally not our role to sua sponte address issues not raised by the appellant.”); Christina G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ.

See Crystal E. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 5 (App. 2017).

Decision of the Court -78, ¶¶ 5-6 (App. 2017) ("[W]e adhere to the policy that it is generally not our role to sua sponte address issues not raised by the appellant.").

See Crystal E. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 5 (App. 2017).

See Crystal E. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 5 (App. 2017).

See Crystal E. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 5 (App. 2017).1 CONCLUSION ¶19 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

See ARCAP 13(a)(7)(A); Crystal E. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 6 (App. 2017) (“[W]e adhere to the policy that it is generally not our role to sua sponte address issues not raised by the appellant.”); Christina G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ.

“To support an order terminating parental rights, the [juvenile] court must find at least one statutory ground by clear and convincing evidence.” Crystal E. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 4 (App. 2017).

¶12 This court has held that failure to challenge a ground for termination abandons and waives “any contention that the court erred in granting [termination] on that basis.” -78, ¶ 5 (App. 2017).

See Crystal E. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 1 (App. 2017) (“Because Mother challenges only the substance abuse ground on appeal, she has abandoned and waived any challenge to the court’s finding of the statutory time-in- care ground.”).

¶ 6 (App. 2017) ("[W]e adhere to the policy that it is generally not our role to sua sponte address issues not raised by the appellant.").

See Crystal E. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 5 (App. 2017).

See Crystal E. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 5 (App. 2017).

Crystal E. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 4 (App. 2017).

Crystal E. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 4 (App. 2017); Ariz. R.P.

See, e.g., Crystal E. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 9 (App. 2017) (“In meeting this burden [to prove termination of parental rights is in a child’s best interests], DCS may establish that the child is adoptable and would benefit from an adoptive placement.

¶ 5 (App. 2017) ("[O]nly one statutory ground for severance is required.").