In Re Delinquency of C.R.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE DELINQUENCY OF C.R.

No. 1 CA-JV 24-0067
FILED 09-24-2024

Appeal from the Superior Court in Navajo County
No. S0900JV202200160
The Honorable Michala M. Ruechel, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Navajo County Attorney’s Office, Holbrook
By Myles A. Braccio
Counsel for Appellee

The Riggs Law Firm, P.L.L.C., Pinetop
By Brett R. Rigg
Counsel for Appellant

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Jennifer M. Perkins delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Michael S. Catlett and Vice Chief Judge Randall M. Howe
joined.

IN RE DELINQUENCY OF C.R.
Decision of the Court

P E R K I N S, Judge:

¶1 Caleb appeals the juvenile court’s order requiring him to
register as a sex offender until he is twenty-five. We use a pseudonym to
protect the juvenile’s identity. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Sometime between June and August 2022, seventeen-year-old
Caleb molested his autistic seven-year-old female cousin while they were
alone at their grandparents’ house. In September 2022, Caleb pled
delinquent to one count of attempted molestation of a child under fifteen, a
class 3 felony if committed by an adult. The court postponed disposition
until Caleb could undergo a psychosexual evaluation.

¶3 In November 2022, Caleb completed a psychosexual
evaluation, which revealed he had previously engaged in sexual
misconduct with his two younger half-sisters, despite parental intervention
and counseling. At his December 2022 disposition hearing, the court
ordered Caleb into inpatient treatment, put him on intensive probation and
sex offender probation, and ordered Caleb to participate in a sex offender
treatment program. The court deferred the issue of sex offender registration
until Caleb was further into his treatment programs.

¶4 In January 2024, Caleb underwent a second psychosexual
evaluation. His updated evaluation showed minimal progress. Caleb had
difficulty retaining and applying the skills he was learning in treatment,
was struggling to identify his impact on his victims, and had continuing
deviant sexual interests in some areas. Despite these findings, the
examining psychologist concluded that Caleb was at a low to moderate risk
of recidivism and had no sexual interest in children. The psychologist noted
that Caleb could likely complete treatment before his nineteenth birthday
and recommended against sex offender registration.

¶5 Based on this evidence and after hearing argument from
counsel, the juvenile court ordered sex-offender registration for Caleb. The
juvenile court was particularly concerned about Caleb’s minimal progress
and lack of engagement in treatment; multiple victims; lack of empathy
towards his victims; and his fast-approaching nineteenth birthday, which
would deprive the court of its jurisdiction. The court was also troubled that
Caleb was concerned about where his mind wanders when left alone, and
that his given reason for the offenses was “because the children were there”
and “easy to get to.” Citing public safety concerns and continuing barriers

2

IN RE DELINQUENCY OF C.R.
Decision of the Court

to treatment, the court ordered registration until age twenty-five based on
the totality of the circumstances. An order requiring sex offender
registration for a juvenile is a final, appealable order. In re Javier B., 230 Ariz.
100, 102, ¶¶ 11–12 (App. 2012). We have jurisdiction. A.R.S. § 8-235(A).

DISCUSSION

¶6 The juvenile court may require a juvenile who has been found
delinquent of certain offenses, including attempted child molestation, to
register as a sex offender until age twenty-five. A.R.S. § 13-3821(A)(7), (D).
We review a juvenile court’s order requiring a juvenile to register as a sex
offender for an abuse of discretion. In re Javier B., 230 Ariz. at 104, ¶ 17. A
court abuses its discretion if its order is “characterized by capriciousness,
arbitrariness or by failure to conduct an adequate investigation into facts
necessary for an intelligent exercise of the court’s sentencing power.” State
v. Grier, 146 Ariz. 511, 515 (1985). We review facts in the light most favorable
to sustaining the juvenile court’s order. In re Amber S., 225 Ariz. 364, 366–
67, ¶ 6 (App. 2010).

I. Registration

¶7 Caleb contends the court failed to state a compelling reason
justice required him to register as a sex offender. He first argues registration
was not necessary to put the community on notice because his report
indicates he is at a low risk to reoffend and is not sexually interested in
children. But despite his lack of sexual interest in children, Caleb already
had multiple victims and he stated the incidents occurred merely because
the children were available to him.

¶8 Caleb next argues the court put too much weight on his
“single statement” about being left alone with his thoughts, and that the
court ordered registration merely to punish him for his lack of empathy and
sexual thoughts. But the court did not consider this one statement in
isolation. Its decision encompassed several concerning statements Caleb
made; the results of his psychosexual evaluations; his monthly treatment
updates; his multiple victims; and the short timeframe before Caleb left the
court’s jurisdiction.

¶9 Caleb also contends the court failed to consider the harmful
effect registration could have on his future. A juvenile court may—but is
not obligated to—consider the effect registration could have on a juvenile’s
future. In re Javier B., 230 Ariz. at 104, ¶ 19. And “A.R.S. § 13-3821 does not
direct the court to consider any specific factors before making its
determination on whether to order a juvenile to register.” Id. at ¶ 18. The

3

IN RE DELINQUENCY OF C.R.
Decision of the Court

effect of sex offender registration on a juvenile’s future is but one factor a
court may assess in exercising its broad discretion to impose sentences
within statutory limits. See State v. Davis, 226 Ariz. 97, 102, ¶ 23 (App. 2010).

¶10 Sufficient evidence in the record supports the court’s
decision. The court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Caleb to register
as a sex offender.

II. Timing and Due Process

¶11 For the first time on appeal, Caleb argues the juvenile court
violated his due process rights by waiting over a year between adjudication
and final disposition. We review issues raised for the first time on appeal
for fundamental error. See In re Natalie Z., 214 Ariz. 452, 455, ¶ 7 (App. 2007).
Caleb has failed to develop an argument on fundamental error, which
ordinarily effects a waiver. State v. Moreno-Medrano, 218 Ariz. 349, 354, ¶ 17
(App. 2008). But this court may exercise its discretion to address
constitutional arguments raised for the first time on appeal. Marco C. v. Sean
C., 218 Ariz. 216, 219, ¶ 6 (App. 2008). We elect to do so here.

¶12 “The juvenile court has the discretion to modify a juvenile’s
disposition according to the juvenile’s evolving needs and situation.
However, that jurisdiction must be exercised in accordance with due
process standards.” In re Richard M., 196 Ariz. 84, 86–87, ¶ 11 (App. 1999)
(cleaned up). Procedural due process requires notice and the opportunity
to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. McClung v.
Bennett, 225 Ariz. 154, 156, ¶ 8 (2010).

¶13 Here, Caleb had ample notice that the court might order him
to register as a sex offender, and that the decision depended on his progress
with treatment. Before accepting Caleb’s plea agreement, the juvenile court
warned Caleb that registration was a potential consequence of the plea. The
court warned him of the same again at the initial disposition hearing when
the judge stated, “Under the juvenile law . . . you can be required to register
until you’re 25. The Court is going to wait to make that determination until
I see how well you’ve done in treatment.” The court also held several
review hearings and received monthly treatment updates. Caleb offers no
evidence that he lacked the opportunity to be heard.

¶14 Caleb contends it was unfair for the court to defer its
registration decision because doing so allowed the court to consider
evidence unavailable at the time of disposition. But a juvenile court can
defer its decision to add a juvenile to the sex offender registry to evaluate
the juvenile over time and determine whether the juvenile has been

4

IN RE DELINQUENCY OF C.R.
Decision of the Court

sufficiently rehabilitated. See In re Javier B., 230 Ariz. at 103, ¶ 15. Rather
than working an unfairness, this deferred process fulfills the rehabilitative
purpose of the juvenile court and promotes the best interests of the juvenile.
Id. The juvenile court’s decision to defer requiring Caleb to register as a sex
offender was not fundamentally unfair.

CONCLUSION

¶15 We affirm.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AGFV

5