Cited by

No. MH2003–000240, ¶ 6 (App. 2003).

See In re Maricopa County Superior Court No. MH2003-000240, –70, ¶ 10 (App. 2003) (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s request for continuance to retain private counsel, in part because she “had no funds with which to hire private counsel, undercutting the proffered reason for the continuance”).

¶ 8 (App. 2016) (citing In re MH2003–000240, ¶ 7 (App. 2003) ("Courts ordinarily interpret 'shall' to mean the provision is mandatory.")).

In re MH2003-000240, ¶ 10 (App. 2003).

In re MH2003-000240, –70, ¶ 10 (App. 2003).

Ct. No. MH2003-000240, ¶ 10 (App. 2003).

In re MH2003-000240, ¶ 10 (App. 2003).

Ct. No. MH2003- 000240, ¶ 7 (App. 2003) (“Courts ordinarily interpret ‘shall’ to mean the provision is mandatory.”).

Ct. No. MH2003-000240, ¶ 10

The superior court, however, has “wide latitude in balancing the right to counsel of choice against the needs of fairness, and against the demands of its calendar,” though the court’s decision may not be “unreasoning and arbitrary.” ¶ 5, (citations omitted); see also In re MH 2003- 000240, ¶ 9, (superior court has discretion to grant motion to continue); A.R.S.

if the patient requests a continuance, the court may set the hearing later than six days after the petition was filed, up to a maximum of *445 thirty days.” In re MH 2003-000240, ¶ 6 , (emphasis omitted).

Although a “may” provision normally is interpreted as permissive, In re Maricopa County Superior Court No. MH2003-000240, ¶ 7 , this court has previously determined that the use of “may” in describing administrative review processes does not necessarily render the procedures permissive.

In re Maricopa County Superior Court No. MH 2003-000240, ¶ 10