Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Guthrie v. Jones, 43 P.3d 601.

30 citing documents.

State v. Hon gordon/owen 544 P.3d 673 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
State v. Hon gordon/owen 544 P.3d 673 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
1(a); ¶ 4 (App. 2002) (accepting special action jurisdiction “when, as here, the superior court has acted as an appellate court” and “a special action is [the petitioner’s] only means to seek relief”).
Prosise v. Hon kottke/state 466 P.3d 386 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
Prosise v. Hon kottke/state 466 P.3d 386 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
¶11 “Because [Prosise] does not question the validity of the statutes under which he was convicted, a special action is his only means to seek relief.” ¶ 4 (App. 2002); see also A.R.S.
Allen v. Sanders 346 P.3d 30 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
Allen v. Sanders 346 P.3d 30 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
Bourne v. McClennen 333 P.3d 750 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
Bourne v. McClennen 333 P.3d 750 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
1(a), and this special action presents an issue of statutory construction — a pure question of law — that, based on the record before us, has arisen often, has been the subject of conflicting rulings, ¶ 4 , and is subject to our de novo review, see State ex rel.
Cv-12-0319-Pr State of Arizona v. Joseph Cooperman 306 P.3d 4 Ariz. 2013
Cv-12-0319-Pr State of Arizona v. Joseph Cooperman 306 P.3d 4 Ariz. 2013
As noted in Guthrie v. Jones, “[a]lcohol in the breath does not cause impairment; impairment results when alcohol enters the body, is absorbed into the bloodstream, and is transported to the central nervous system and the brain.” ¶ 5
State of Arizona v. Cooperman 282 P.3d 446 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
State of Arizona v. Cooperman 282 P.3d 446 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
 ¶1 this court held that evidence regarding breath-to-blood partition ratios1 is inadmissible in a prosecution for driving or being in actual physical control of a vehicle with an alcohol concentration of .08 or more within two hours of driving, in violation of A.R.S.
Carrillo v. Houser 214 P.3d 444 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
Carrillo v. Houser 214 P.3d 444 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
TOWN OF GILBERT PROSECUTOR'S OFC. v. Downie 162 P.3d 669 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
TOWN OF GILBERT PROSECUTOR'S OFC. v. Downie 162 P.3d 669 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
§ 22-375 (2002); ¶ 4 , Ariz. R.P.
State v. Slayton 154 P.3d 1057 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
State v. Slayton 154 P.3d 1057 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
State v. Arellano 143 P.3d 1015 Ariz. 2006
State v. Arellano 143 P.3d 1015 Ariz. 2006
See, ¶ 18, (discussing rebuttable presumption of intoxication or non-intoxication in prosecutions for driving under the influence); (noting that A.R.S.
State v. Storholm 109 P.3d 94 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
State v. Storholm 109 P.3d 94 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
Raye v. Jones 76 P.3d 863 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
Raye v. Jones 76 P.3d 863 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
Goy v. Jones 72 P.3d 351 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
Goy v. Jones 72 P.3d 351 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
Goy adds that she has no remedy by appeal because when, as here, the superior court has acted as an appellate court, a further appeal to this court is allowed only “if the action involves the validity of a tax, impost, assessment, toll, municipal fine or statute.” , 274 ¶ 4, ARIZ. REV. STAT. (“A.R.S.”) § 22-375(A) (2002).
State v. Esser 70 P.3d 449 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
State of Arizona v. John Robert Esser Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
State of Arizona v. John Robert Esser Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
§ 28-1381(A)(2), or “per se DUI.” ¶¶1-2, ¶¶1-2 (App. 2002).
State v. Esser 70 P.3d 449 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
§ 28-1381(A)(2), or "per se DUI.” ¶¶ 1-2 , ¶¶ 1-2 (App.2002).