Cited by

¶ 8 (App. 2009) ( (recognizing the "strong Arizona policy against using extraordinary writs as substitutes for appeals")).

¶23 The special-action rules are consistent with long-standing caselaw recognizing that “[s]pecial actions may not be used as a substitute for an appeal.” ¶ 8 (App. 2009) ( (affirming the “strong Arizona policy against using extraordinary writs as substitutes for appeals”)).

¶23 Father argues that the court “abused its discretion [by] not considering the school choice factors”

¶¶ 19-20, 22 (App. 2009) (“Of course, the ‘best interests of the child’ standard does not and cannot abrogate a fit parent’s constitutional right to direct the upbringing of his or her child.”).

Mother argues the family court (1) erred in ordering Mother and Kyle Jeffry Killebrew (“Father”) to choose a school for their children using distance as the only factor; (2) ¶¶ 23-24 (App. 2009); and (3) effectively usurped her authority to make a final decision on a choice of school for the parties’ children.

When an impasse occurs, the court is authorized to determine not only the parenting plan element in dispute, but also “other factors that are necessary to promote and protect the emotional and physical health of the child.” § 25-403.02(D); ¶¶ 19–20 (App. 2009) (concluding that former, identical version of § 25-403.02(D) authorized the family court to apply best-interests standard to resolve parents’ disagreement about which school children should attend).

record, Father is “not a safe candidate as the primary residential parent.” As discussed above, in Father’s response to Mother’s Motion for New Trial, he presented evidence that the speeding and driving on a suspended license 6 Mother also argues this case involved a “school placement dispute,”

5 ¶ 29 In support of its school-choice order, the superior court relied on Jordan v. Rea

§ 25-403.02(D) (Supp. 2015); -89, ¶¶ 19, 22-24, -27 (App. 2009).

¶5 Five days after the evidentiary hearing, the court filed a minute entry order noting that “[n]either party cited the controlling case on [the issue of child’s school placement], P.3d 919 (App. 2009).

4 BAKER v. MEYER Opinion of the Court into the dissolution decree and because it is “akin to a type of contractual agreement between the parties.”

¶ 8 , Stapert v. Ariz. Bd.

-88, ¶ 14 , -26 (App.2009).