Cited by
Opinions in Arizona that cite Lund v. Donahoe, 261 P.3d 456.
- Vasquez v. Ramirez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
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Vasquez v. Ramirez
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
VASQUEZ v. RAMIREZ Decision of the Court hearing, such a hearing “allows a trial court to determine whether a party, as opposed to that party’s counsel, is responsible for a disclosure or discovery violation, and ‘is aimed at protecting a party from dispositive sanctions when the fault lies only with counsel.’” Marquez, 231 Ariz. at 444, ¶ 26 ( ¶¶ 33–34 (App. 2011).
- State Bar v. Papa Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
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State Bar v. Papa
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
¶9 “A finding of civil contempt requires that the contemnor (1) has knowledge of a lawful court order, (2) has the ability to comply[,] and (3) fails to do so.” ¶ 41 (App. 2011).
- Salcido v. Hamilton Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
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Salcido v. Hamilton
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
¶ 34 (App. 2011) (A culprit hearing is “aimed at protecting a party from dispositive sanctions when the fault lies only with counsel.”).
- Powers Steel v. Vinton Steel Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2021
- Powers Steel v. Vinton Steel Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2021
- Berg v. Weiss & Moy Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
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Berg v. Weiss & Moy
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
¶ 10 (2003); 3 As an additional sanction, the superior court referred Bruno to the State Bar of Arizona “for appropriate disciplinary action.” 8 BERG, et al. v. WEISS & MOY, ¶ 19 (App. 2011); ¶ 16 (App. 2009) (deferring to the superior court’s credibility determinations).
- Williamsfield v. Stren Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
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Williamsfield v. Stren
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
Such hearings present an opportunity for the client to reveal to the court its lack of involvement in sanctionable conduct.” ¶ 34 (App. 2011) (citing cases); ¶ 26 (App. 2013).
- Kostadinova v. Stephens Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
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Followed
Kostadinova v. Stephens
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
We are bound by the superior court’s findings of fact, “unless they are clearly erroneous or unsupported by any credible evidence.” –79, ¶ 19 (App. 2011).
- Hawkins v. Secura Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
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Hawkins v. Secura
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
See, ¶ 21 (App. 2011) (“Arizona has a long-favored practice of allowing full cross- examination of expert witnesses, including inquiry about the expert’s sources, relations with the hiring party and counsel, possible bias, and prior opinions”) (quoting Ariz. Indep.
- Marriage of Henderson v. Henderson 390 P.3d 1226 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2017
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Marriage of Henderson v. Henderson
390 P.3d 1226
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2017
(sanctions); , (contempt).
- Silverwood v. Kush Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
- Silverwood v. Kush Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
- Hiller v. Hualapai Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
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Hiller v. Hualapai
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
¶¶ 33–34, (describing the purpose of a “culprit hearing,” which assesses whether lawyer or party should be held responsible for a discovery violation, as “protecting a party from dispositive sanctions when the fault lies only with counsel”).
- Smith v. Frederick Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
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Smith v. Frederick
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
( ¶¶ 33-34, ), and to ensure that the party against whom a sanction is imposed has received due process.
- In Re $70,070 in U.S. Currency 335 P.3d 545 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
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In Re $70,070 in U.S. Currency
335 P.3d 545
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
interest is subject to forfeiture,” Peña’s counsel stated that he “d[id]n’t interpret [the order] the same way.” As a result of this confusion, Peña was denied the opportunity to meaningfully contest the state’s allegations through the presentation of testimony and cross-examination of the state’s witnesses.4 -66 (App. 2011) (finding due process violation where court provided insufficient notice that “order to show cause” hearing would involve evidentiary hearing at which attorneys would be call
- Marquez v. Ortega 296 P.3d 100 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2013
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Marquez v. Ortega
296 P.3d 100
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2013
¶ 26 A “culprit hearing,” as it is commonly called, allows a trial court to determine whether a party, as opposed to that party’s counsel, is responsible for a disclosure or discovery violation, and “is aimed at protecting a party from dispositive sanctions when the fault lies only with counsel.” ¶¶ 33-34 , (citation omitted).
- Lund v. Myers 286 P.3d 789 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012
- Lund v. Myers 286 P.3d 789 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012