Cited by

¶ 11 (App. 2016); see also Ariz. R. Fam.

[that] has prevented the unsuccessful party from having a fair submission of the controversy.” ¶17 (App. 2016) (citation omitted).

“The superior court may set aside a judgment at any time when the moving party proves the judgment was the product of fraud upon the court.” Clark, 243 Ariz. at 275, ¶ 13 (citation omitted); ¶ 23 (App. 2016) (holding the court “did not err by concluding that intentionally creating and using a fraudulent acknowledgment of paternity under the circumstances .

See Alvarado v. 3 ¶ 17 (App. 2016).

But Maniatis fails to show how this amounted to “the most egregious conduct involving a corruption of the judicial process itself.” ¶ 17 (App. 2016) ().

Fraud occurs “[w]hen a party obtains a judgment by concealing material facts and suppressing the truth with the intent to mislead the court.” –77, ¶ 14 (App. 2014) (citation omitted); –17, ¶ 21 (App. 2016) (finding fraud when individual used a fraudulent acknowledgement of paternity “to obtain a birth certificate and to avoid court proceedings that would have required a best-interests assessment”).

¶ 2, n.1 (App. 2016); ¶ 14 (App. 1998).

¶ 10 (App. 2017) ( ¶ 11 (App. 2016)).

of Maricopa, ¶ 23 (App. 2011) (holding superior court erred by ordering child returned to mother as a sanction for ADES’ failure to follow statutory procedure and citing Hays for the proposition that a court must consider the child’s best interests in deciding whether to impose contempt sanctions in a custody case); -17, ¶¶ 17, 21 (App. 2016) (holding superior court properly set aside a fraudulent acknowledgement of paternity that was used to avoid the judicial best-interests determination requi

See Alvarado v. Thomson , , 14, ¶ 11

–43 (App. 2015) (accepting special-action jurisdiction in part because child would face prolonged period of uncertainty while appeal pending); K.D.