Cited by

¶ 9 (App. 2020); ¶ 17 (App. 2017).

§§ 25-315(F)(2), (4); ¶ 12 (App. 2017) (“temporary orders .

“If the language of a statute or rule is unambiguous, ‘we apply it as written.’” ¶ 28 (App. 2017) ( ¶ 6 (2015)).

¶ 44 (App. 2017) (“Although this is not a relocation case under § 25-408, the superior court may consider § 25-408 factors in resolving a long-distance parenting issue.”); ¶ 15 (App. 2008) (“[T]he courts are both empowered and obliged to consider the child’s best interests w

¶ 12 (App. 2017) (temporary parenting orders are “merely preparatory to a later proceeding,” therefore, they are not appealable and require a party to seek special action relief).

¶ 28 (App. 2017); ¶ 7 (App. 2009) (whether the relocation statute applied is a question of law reviewed de novo).

See Meienberg, 215 Ariz. at 50, ¶ 27; Miller, 175 Ariz. at 299; –68, ¶ 34 (App. 2017) (making statutorily-required findings and revealing the court’s reasoning, on the record, aids the appellant, the reviewing court, and all parties “in determining the best interests of the child or children both currently and in the future”) (quotation omitted).

Special action jurisdiction also is appropriate when a statute requires “immediate interpretation;” when a petition “presents a purely legal issue of first impression that is of statewide importance” and when the issue “is likely to recur.” ¶ 13 (App. 2017); Welch– ¶ 10 (App. 2002).

-68, ¶ 34 (App. 2017) (stating that § 25-403’s requirement of specific best interest findings exists to aid appellate review and the parties and the family court in determining the best interest of a child “both currently and in the future” ( ¶ 18 (App. 2009))).

-68, ¶ 34 (App. 2017) (section 25-403 requirement of specific best interests findings, including court’s reasoning, “exists” to aid appellate review and to aid parties and family court in determining best interests of a child “both currently and in the future”) (citation omitted).

¶ 12 (App. 2017); see Ariz. R.P.