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¶24 Kestenbaum also argues Bertleson did not consider the burden imposed on plaintiffs as noted by Hunter

Eastin v. Broomfield , , 580, , 748 (1977) ; see also McGowan, 366 U.S. at 425 -26 , 81 S.Ct.

The legislature, however, may classify persons or property, as long as the classification is “predicated on some reasonable basis, which will promote a legitimate purpose of legislation.” Moore, 35 Ariz. at 33; (“Laws operating uniformly upon all of a class, when the classification has a basis founded in reason, are not obnoxious to any constitutional provision with which we are familiar.

art. 6, § 1 (“Judicial power; courts”), § 5(5) (vesting the Supreme Court with “[pjower to make rules relative to all procedural matters in any court”); cf. Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz, 576, 586, (finding a non-waivable cost bond requirement in medical malpractice cases unconstitutional under article 2, section 13 of Arizona Constitution, “by denying access to the courts”); New v. Ariz. Bd.

We presume that a statute is constitutional, and the “party asserting its unconstitutionality bears the burden of overcoming the presumption.” 3

Tocco, 156 Ariz. at 119 ().

We presume that the statute is constitutional, and a “party asserting its unconstitutionality bears the burden of overcoming the presumption.”

We presume that the statute is constitutional, and a “party asserting its unconstitutionality bears the burden of overcoming the presumption.”

¶33 Our analysis is guided by “a strong presumption supporting the constitutionality of a legislative enactment and the party asserting its unconstitutionality bears the burden of overcoming the presumption.” Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 580

See Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 1 (vesting judicial power in the judicial department); (“Judicial power is the power of the court to decide and pronounce a judgment and carry it into effect between persons 2 and parties .

(statute requiring medical malpractice claim first be submitted to review panel before jury trial did not violate jury trial right because jury still was “final arbiter” of facts and issues).

Ariz. Const, art. 6, § 1 (“The judicial power shall be vested in an integrated judicial department____”); , 226 P. 908, 910 (1924) (“Judicial power is the power of the court to decide and pronounce a judgment and carry it into effect between persons and parties who bring a case before it for decision.”)

in which our supreme court stated: “We believe that the legislature has the right to abolish the collateral source rule as it affects medical malpractice cases just as it has done in the work[ers’] compensation field.” The supreme court in Eastin relied on Ruth v. Industrial Commissi

¶27 This court has recognized, however, that “commentators have generally opposed the rule.” Hall, 119 Ariz. at 74 n.1, 579 P.2d at 578 n.1 (citing articles); (“The validity of these rationales [in support of the collateral source rule] has been questioned by commentators .

Jona Goldschmidt, Where Have All the Panels Gone?