Cited by
Opinions in Arizona that cite Cohen v. State, 588 P.2d 299.
- Vande Krol v. superstition/benchmark Ariz. 2025
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Vande Krol v. superstition/benchmark
Ariz. 2025
(“[A] statute is not retroactive in application simply because it may relate to antecedent facts.”); (“[L]aws are not retrospective by their mere relation to antecedent conditions.”); Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 273 (1994) (“When 5 Of note is the fact that the stated purpose for including the fifteen-year diagnosis limitation in 2017 was to “[l]imit application of new and existing cancer pr
- Desert Mountain v. Flagstaff Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
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Desert Mountain v. Flagstaff
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
No. 8, 121 Ariz. 6 DESERT MOUNTAIN v. FLAGSTAFF Opinion of the Court 264, 267 (App. 1978).
- Flanigan v. Arizona registrar/r&c Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
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Flanigan v. Arizona registrar/r&c
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
Freight Sys., Inc., – 40 (1986); (Civil statutes “may not be applied retroactively in the absence of a specific provision to that effect.
- State Ex Rel Brnovich v. City of Phoenix Ariz. 2020
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State Ex Rel Brnovich v. City of Phoenix
Ariz. 2020
Eng’g (stating that a statute imposing a duty on a public official “must be prescribed in terms sufficient and definite to serve as a guide” for “intelligent execution”); (“[S]tatutory language must be sufficiently definite so that those who are to execute the law may do so in a rational and reasoned manner.”).
- State Ex Rel Brnovich v. City of tucson/dewit 399 P.3d 663 Ariz. 2017
- Shah v. Az Brd Dental Exam Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
- Shah v. Az Brd Dental Exam Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
- Vong v. Aune 328 P.3d 1057 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
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Vong v. Aune
328 P.3d 1057
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
Yet they merely illustrate the scope of the power and do not delimit it.”); (“[I]t is well established that the right to pursue a profession is subject to the paramount right of the state under its police powers to regulate business and professions in order to protect the public health, morals and welfare.”).
- Midtown Medical Group, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 206 P.3d 790 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
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Midtown Medical Group, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
206 P.3d 790
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
(“[C]ourt[s] should avoid legislating a particular result by judicial construction.”); State ex rel.
- Backus v. State 204 P.3d 399 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
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Backus v. State
204 P.3d 399
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
("[I]ndefiniteness in any statute may constitute an unconstitutional denial of due process of law as guaranteed by the [F]ourteenlh [Ajmendmenl of the United States Constitution and [Ajrticle 2, [Section] 4 of the Arizona Constitution when it is so vague that men of common intelligence mu
- Gamez v. Industrial Com'n of Arizona 141 P.3d 794 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2006
- Scheehle v. Justices of the Supreme Court 120 P.3d 1092 Ariz. 2005
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Scheehle v. Justices of the Supreme Court
120 P.3d 1092
Ariz. 2005
welfare.” (citing Ariz. State Bd.
- Fearnow v. Ridenour, Swenson, Cleere & Evans, P.C. 110 P.3d 357 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
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Fearnow v. Ridenour, Swenson, Cleere & Evans, P.C.
110 P.3d 357
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
(“[A] court should avoid legislating a particular result by judicial construction.”).
- Marriage of Cook v. Cook 104 P.3d 857 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
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Marriage of Cook v. Cook
104 P.3d 857
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
60 (1803); , (declaring legislation invalid based on constitutional grounds); , (concluding that Arizona’s legislative enactment limiting marriage to one man and one woman was constitutional).
- Morgan v. Carillon Investments, Inc. 88 P.3d 1159 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
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Morgan v. Carillon Investments, Inc.
88 P.3d 1159
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
(“court[s] should avoid legislating a particular result by judicial construction”); State ex rel.
- In re B.S. 74 P.3d 285 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
- In Re BS 74 P.3d 285 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
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In Re BS
74 P.3d 285
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
(citation omitted) (holding "court[s] should avoid legislating a particular result by judicial construction"); State ex rel.
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In re B.S.
74 P.3d 285
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
(citation omitted) (holding “eourt[s] should avoid legislating a particular result by judicial construction”); State ex rel.
- In Re Leon G. 18 P.3d 169 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
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In Re Leon G.
18 P.3d 169
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
what the constitution contains, but not what it should contain”); , (adding phrase to statute by "judicial fiat,” despite benevolent intent, “would be an infringement upon the province of the legislature”); , ("court[s] should avoid legislating a particular result by judicial construction”); First Nat’l , (rewriting unconstitutional statute a legislative function)
- Aranda v. Industrial Com'n of Arizona 989 P.2d 157 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
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Aranda v. Industrial Com'n of Arizona
989 P.2d 157
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
Freight System, Inc., , , (emphasis original in Hall); see San Carlos Apache Tribe, 193 Ariz. at 205 , 972 P.2d at 189
- Comeau v. Arizona State Board of Dental Examiners 993 P.2d 1066 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
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Comeau v. Arizona State Board of Dental Examiners
993 P.2d 1066
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
It is also true that “the right to pursue a profession is subject to the paramount right of the state under its police powers to regulate business and professions in order to protect the public health, morals and welfare.”
- Hansson v. Arizona State Board of Dental Examiners 985 P.2d 551 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
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Hansson v. Arizona State Board of Dental Examiners
985 P.2d 551
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
( , ); see also Application of Levine, , (state may not preclude right to engage in profession for reasons which violate due process); , (citation omitted) (state regulation of rig
- State Compensation Fund v. Symington 848 P.2d 273 Ariz. 1993
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State Compensation Fund v. Symington
848 P.2d 273
Ariz. 1993
Fund, 166 Ariz. at 151 , 800 P.2d at 1259 ( , ).
- State v. Ramsey 831 P.2d 408 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
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State v. Ramsey
831 P.2d 408
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
Prentiss, 163 Ariz. at 86 , 786 P.2d at 937 ( , ).
- Neal v. City of Kingman 810 P.2d 572 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1991
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Neal v. City of Kingman
810 P.2d 572
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1991
Neal contends that the word “oriented” is vague in the context used, and as proof of his position he points out that soon after the problem with his sign arose, the city amended the ordinance by substituting the word “perpendicular” for “oriented.” , for the proposition that when a statute is so vague that men of common intelligence must guess at its meaning and may differ as to how it should be applied, the application of the statute may constitute a denial of due process.
- Tracy v. Superior Court 810 P.2d 1030 Ariz. 1991
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Tracy v. Superior Court
810 P.2d 1030
Ariz. 1991
(statutes must be construed in view of the purpose they are intended to accomplish and the evils they are designed to remedy).
- Arizona State Board of Dental Examiners v. Fleischman 806 P.2d 900 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1990
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Arizona State Board of Dental Examiners v. Fleischman
806 P.2d 900
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1990
It is equally well settled that “the right to pursue a profession is subject to the paramount right of the state under its police powers to regulate business and professions in order to protect the public health, morals and welfare.”
- Republic Investment Fund I v. Town of Surprise 800 P.2d 1251 Ariz. 1990
- Republic Investment Fund I v. Town of Surprise 800 P.2d 1251 Ariz. 1990