Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Matter of Gubser, 614 P.2d 845.

46 citing documents.

Williams v. ades/lamont Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
Williams v. ades/lamont Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
Davey v. Roberts Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
Davey v. Roberts Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
Instead, “[f]or appellant to qualify as an aggrieved party, the judgment must operate to deny her some personal or property right or to impose a substantial burden upon her.”
Red Mountain v. Ingle Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
Red Mountain v. Ingle Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
See, (“Appellant can appeal from only that part of the judgment by which she is aggrieved.”); MCA Fin.
Bobrow v. Bobrow 391 P.3d 646 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
Bobrow v. Bobrow 391 P.3d 646 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
at 247, ; -05 , (concluding authority to award fees under § 25-324 and then § 25-332(C) trumped settlement agreement’s prevailing-party provision in a proceeding to modify child custody).
Petrocelli v. Anderson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
Petrocelli v. Anderson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
Additionally, “[a]n appeal may only be taken by a party aggrieved by the judgment.” ¶ 9 (App. 2008) (citations omitted); Ariz. R. Civ.
Bmo Harris v. Thruston Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
Bmo Harris v. Thruston Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
If a superior court judgment addresses multiple claims for relief, an appellant may only appeal from “that part of the judgment by which [he or she] is aggrieved.” (citation omitted).
Kondaur Capital Corp. v. Pinal County 330 P.3d 379 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
Kondaur Capital Corp. v. Pinal County 330 P.3d 379 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
5 KONDAUR CAPITAL CORP. v. PINAL CO. Opinion of the Court 223, 226 (App. 2007)
MacLean v. Kappa Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
MacLean v. Kappa Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
143 Ariz. at 248, 693 P.2d at 903; –05, –47 (1980) (concluding authority to award fees under § 25-324 and then § 25-332(C) trumped settlement agreement’s prevailing-party provision in a proceeding to modify child custody).
In Re Estate of Friedman 177 P.3d 290 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
In Re Estate of Friedman 177 P.3d 290 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
A party is “aggrieved” if the judgment “denies that party some personal or property right or imposes on that party some substantial burden or obligation.” ¶ 10 , ( , ).
Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe 170 P.3d 712 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe 170 P.3d 712 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
See ARCAP 1 (“An appeal may be taken by any party aggrieved by the judgment.”); , (appellant is aggrieved party if the judgment ”operate[s] to deny her some personal or property right or to impose a substantial burden upon her”); see also Doe v. 2TheMart.com Inc., 140 F.Supp.2d 1088 , 1091 n. 2 (W.D.Wash.2001) ("When an individual wishes to protect their First Amendm
Harris, Wilson, Angel Team Home Care v. Cochise Health Systems Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
Harris, Wilson, Angel Team Home Care v. Cochise Health Systems Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
“For appellant to qualify as an aggrieved party, the judgment must operate to deny her some personal or property right or to impose a substantial burden upon her.”
Magee v. Magee 81 P.3d 1048 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
Magee v. Magee 81 P.3d 1048 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
In particular, he relies on , in which the Arizona Supreme Court stated that A.R.S.
Kerr v. Killian 3 P.3d 1133 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
Kerr v. Killian 3 P.3d 1133 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
State v. Lamberton 899 P.2d 939 Ariz. 1995
State v. Lamberton 899 P.2d 939 Ariz. 1995
(noting that “[a]n appeal may be taken by any party aggrieved by the judgment,” under rule 1, Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure).
Larkin v. State Ex Rel. Rottas 857 P.2d 1271 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
Larkin v. State Ex Rel. Rottas 857 P.2d 1271 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
State v. O’Connor, , ( , ).
State v. O'CONNOR 827 P.2d 480 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
State v. O'CONNOR 827 P.2d 480 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
Greenwood v. Peterson 717 P.2d 892 Ariz. 1986
Matter of Strobel 717 P.2d 892 Ariz. 1986
Greenwood v. Peterson 717 P.2d 892 Ariz. 1986
297 P. 443, 444 (1931) (emphasis in original)
Matter of Strobel 717 P.2d 892 Ariz. 1986
297 P. 443, 444 (1931) (emphasis in original)
Great Southwest Fire Insurance v. Triple "I" Insurance Services., Inc. 727 P.2d 333 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1986
Great Southwest Fire Insurance v. Triple "I" Insurance Services., Inc. 727 P.2d 333 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1986
Rule 73(a), Rules of Civil Procedure, 16 A.R.S.; Rule 1, Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure, 17A A.R.S.; , Christian v. Cotten, 1 Ariz.App.
Edsall v. SUPER. CT. IN & FOR COUNTY OF PIMA 693 P.2d 895 Ariz. 1984
Edsall v. SUPER. CT. IN & FOR COUNTY OF PIMA 693 P.2d 895 Ariz. 1984
The court may order all such amounts paid directly to the attorney, who may *248 enforce the order in his name with the same force and effect, and in the same manner, as if the order had been made on behalf of any party to the action.” , contained a similar provision for an award of attorney’s fees to the successful parties.
In re the Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action No. J-77188 678 P.2d 970 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1983
In re the Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action No. J-77188 678 P.2d 970 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1983
vacated on other grounds
In Re the Appeal in Pima County, Juvenile Action No. B-9385 674 P.2d 845 Ariz. 1983
In Re the Appeal in Pima County, Juvenile Action No. B-9385 674 P.2d 845 Ariz. 1983
Chambers v. United Farm Workers Organizing Committee, 25 Ariz.App.
Countryman v. Countryman 659 P.2d 663 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1983
Countryman v. Countryman 659 P.2d 663 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1983
Olsztyn v. Olsztyn, 20 Ariz.App.