Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Taylor v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 637 P.2d 726.

58 citing documents.

Knight v. Ludwig Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
Knight v. Ludwig Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
Santos v. Trolley Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
Santos v. Trolley Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
Cook v. Grebe 429 P.3d 1161 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
Cook v. Grebe 429 P.3d 1161 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
Co., (citation omitted).
Massey v. 1st Hc Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
Massey v. 1st Hc Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
SOLIMENO v. Yonan 227 P.3d 481 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
SOLIMENO v. Yonan 227 P.3d 481 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
John D. Kaufmann v. State of Arizona Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
John D. Kaufmann v. State of Arizona Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
Co., (attorney fees might be awarded after party’s “complete and repeated disregard of a court order” without justification or, as damages, where wrongful act required other party to defend against others).
Ritchie v. Krasner 211 P.3d 1272 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
Ritchie v. Krasner 211 P.3d 1272 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
Security Title Agency, Inc. v. Pope 200 P.3d 977 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
Security Title Agency, Inc. v. Pope 200 P.3d 977 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
¶ 115 , however, Security Title argues the court erred in awarding fees absent a finding it acted “vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.” The standard set out in Taylor is not relevant to our analysis; it *506 applies when there is no statutory authority for the imposition of sanctions and t
Catherine E. Warner v. Southwest Desert Images, LLC Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
Catherine E. Warner v. Southwest Desert Images, LLC Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
Co., quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 920A(2) (1979).
Lopez v. Safeway Stores, Inc. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2006
Lopez v. Safeway Stores, Inc. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2006
Co., quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 920A(2) (1979); (“The so-called ‘collateral source rule’ states that total or partial compensation for an injury which the injured party receives from a collateral source
Englert v. Carondelet Health Network 13 P.3d 763 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2000
Englert v. Carondelet Health Network 13 P.3d 763 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2000
Larkin v. State Ex Rel. Rottas 857 P.2d 1271 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
Larkin v. State Ex Rel. Rottas 857 P.2d 1271 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
Collins v. First Financial Services, Inc. 815 P.2d 411 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1991
Distinguished Collins v. First Financial Services, Inc. 815 P.2d 411 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1991
In support of its argument that the application of the “tort of another” exception requires such a finding, Chrysler relies on two Arizona cases, McKesson Chemical Co. v. Van Waters & Rogers
McIntyre Refrigeration, Inc. v. Mepco Electra 799 P.2d 901 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
McIntyre Refrigeration, Inc. v. Mepco Electra 799 P.2d 901 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
Rodriguez v. Schlittenhart 780 P.2d 442 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1989
Rodriguez v. Schlittenhart 780 P.2d 442 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1989
supports his position that this evidence was inadmissible.
Foundation Development Corp. v. Loehmann's, Inc. 780 P.2d 1074 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1989
Foundation Development Corp. v. Loehmann's, Inc. 780 P.2d 1074 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1989
Liberatore v. Thompson 760 P.2d 612 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1988
Liberatore v. Thompson 760 P.2d 612 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1988
An order in limine is a directive of avoidance, not a dare to “walk the line.” And though an attorney may think the trial court’s ruling incorrect, he must abide it; one may not “justify the violation of the trial court’s order by arguing the wisdom of the order itself.”
London v. Green Acres Trust 765 P.2d 538 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1988
London v. Green Acres Trust 765 P.2d 538 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1988
Co., , the court recognized that when one, acting vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons, places another in a position, vis-a-vis a third person, so that the second person must incur attorney’s fees to protect his interests, such fees are the legal consequence of the first person’s wrongful c
McKesson Chemical Co. v. Van Waters & Rogers 739 P.2d 211 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1987
McKesson Chemical Co. v. Van Waters & Rogers 739 P.2d 211 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1987
Webb v. Webb 728 P.2d 680 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1986
Webb v. Webb 728 P.2d 680 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1986
In Re Marriage of Benge 726 P.2d 1088 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1986
In Re Marriage of Benge 726 P.2d 1088 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1986
The appellant’s contention that such a fee cannot exceed the agreed fee has been answered, in part
State v. Lukezic 691 P.2d 1088 Ariz. 1984
State v. Lukezic 691 P.2d 1088 Ariz. 1984
King v. Superior Court 673 P.2d 787 Ariz. 1983
King v. Superior Court 673 P.2d 787 Ariz. 1983
While attorney misconduct can be a basis for the granting of a new trial, see, , we have fully examined Rule 59(a) and find that a party’s mere dissatisfaction with his own counsel or allegations of his own counsel’s neglect, inadvertence, or mistake do not justify the granting of a new trial in civil cases.
DVM CO. v. Stag Tobacconist, Ltd. 671 P.2d 907 Ariz. 1983
DVM CO. v. Stag Tobacconist, Ltd. 671 P.2d 907 Ariz. 1983
Gulf Homes, Inc. v. Gonzales 676 P.2d 635 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1983
Gulf Homes, Inc. v. Gonzales 676 P.2d 635 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1983