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¶29 Wife argues, first, that the superior court exceeded its jurisdiction by finding that she committed waste because, she contends, the court “had already classified” the funds she removed from the parties’ joint accounts “as [H]usband’s separate property.” for the proposition that a spouse’s separate property cannot be the subject of a waste claim, Wife argues that “[o]nce the court 7 VARELA v. HAUSER Decision of the Court characterized the funds as Husband’s separate

§ 25-318(A), (E) (2008); ¶ 17 (App. 2014) (noting Weaver's use of "the term 'jurisdiction' in a broader, now antiquated, sense actually referring to courts' authority under the specific controlling statute rather than subject-matter jurisdiction").

In addition, the court had “no jurisdiction to grant a money judgment against one spouse for damage to the separate property of the other spouse in a dissolution proceeding.”

(holding that the court lacks jurisdiction to grant a money judgment against one spouse for damage to the separate property of the other spouse in a dissolution proceeding).

(“[T]he divorce court, in pronouncing a divorce decree, has no authority to compel either party to 5 NITSCH v. KLAVUHN Decision of the Court divest himself or herself of [t]itle to separate property.”); (“[The superior court’s] jurisdiction with respect to separate property is limited to assigning to each spouse his or her separate property .

(“Title 25 defines the boundaries of a dissolution court’s jurisdiction, and the court may not exceed its jurisdiction even when exercising its equitable powers.”); ¶ 6 (App. 2008); -36, ¶ 7 (App. 2002).

“In Arizona, dissolution of marriage proceedings are creatures of statute, and jurisdiction to decide such cases is conferred on the courts by the legislature.” In re Marriage of 4 ¶ 8 (2007); (“Title 25 defines the boundaries of a dissolution court’s jurisdiction, and the court may not exceed its jurisdiction even when exercising its equitable powers.”).

§ 25-318(A) (“[T]he court shall assign each spouse’s sole and separate property to such spouse.”); (holding that the superior court’s jurisdiction over separate property in a dissolution proceeding is limited by statute to “assigning to each spouse his or her separate property .

“Despite the application of equitable standards in a dissolution proceeding, it remains a statutory action, and the trial court has only such jurisdiction as is granted by statute.”

¶16 Distributing property and debt after marriage is a “statutory action, and the [superior] court has only such jurisdiction as is granted by statute.”

See Gerow, 192 Ariz. at 17, ¶¶ 33-36

(“Title 25 defines the boundaries of a dissolution court’s jurisdiction, and the court may not exceed its jurisdiction even when exercising its equitable powers.”).

§ 25-311 (2007) (“The superior court is vested with original jurisdiction to hear and decide all matters arising pursuant to this chapter[.]”); , (“Title 25 defines the boundaries of a dissolution court’s jurisdiction, and the court may not exceed its jurisdiction even when exercising its equitable powers.”); , (“Every power that the superior court exercises in a dissolu

As such, “the guiding principle is that every power exercised by a court in a divorce proceeding must find its source in the relevant statutory framework.” Id.