Cited by

See, –86 (1982) (granting relief where the defaulting garnishee had extensive personal issues in the months before the complaint filed and thought the summons didn’t apply to him).

Rule 60(b)(6), therefore, is a “catch-all” provision, that offers relief only where “extraordinary circumstances” are present

Rule 60(b)(6) is a catchall provision that affords courts the discretion to vacate judgments when a party demonstrates “extraordinary circumstances of hardship or injustice.” 187 (1982); Amanti Elec.

This subsection “vests power … to vacate judgments whenever such action is appropriate to accomplish justice,” (quoting Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 615 (1949)), including providing relief for “extraordinary circumstances of hardship or injustice,” id.

See, (“What is a ‘reasonable time’ within which to make [a] motion must depend on the circumstances of the particular case.”); –87 (1982) (“The need for finality .

P. 60(b)(6).2 The superior court has “extensive discretion” and “broad equitable power[s]” to grant relief under Rule 60, Gonzalez, 243 Ariz. at 534, ¶ 11, when “appropriate to accomplish justice,”

Accordingly, because Mejia had fully paid the previously unpaid assessments (and owed only excludable fees and penalties) as of the date the lien on his property was foreclosed, I would hold that he was entitled to relief under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) based on “extraordinary circumstances of hardship or injustice justifying relief.”

¶28 To obtain relief under Rule 60(b)(6), the moving party also must demonstrate “extraordinary circumstances of hardship or injustice justifying relief.”

rial court to vacate the judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) for “any other reason justifying relief.” Sometimes referred to as the “catchall,” this clause applies only where none of the other subsections of Rule 60(b) apply and the motion raises “extraordinary circumstances of hardship or injustice.” Stewart v. Travers (Estate of Travers), ¶ 24 (App. 1998) (-87 (1982)).

our supreme court held defaulted garnishees were entitled to a more liberal standard in setting aside a default judgment because they are “disinterested part[ies] in the [underlying] proceedings, so far as any prospect of being benefited is concerned, yet .

¶15 Unlike the specific grounds for relief enumerated in clauses one through five, Rule 60(b)(6) is a “broad equitable power” that enables courts to vacate judgments when a party demonstrates “extraordinary circumstances of hardship or injustice.” 187 (1982) (citation omitted); ¶ 12 (App. 2014).

(noting that “trial courts are given broad discretion” under Rule 60(c)); (noting Rule 60(c)(6)’s “broad equitable power”).

Sec., ¶ 16 (App. 2007) (–86 (1982)).

P. 55(c); –86 (1982) (good cause standard applies to setting aside entry of default and to setting aside a default judgment).

¶ 12 (App. 2014); ("Clause 6 [of Rule 60(c)] and the first five clauses are mutually exclusive."); but see Amanti Elec., Inc. v. Engineered Structures, Inc., ¶ 10 (App. 2012) ("[E]ven when relief might have been available under one of the first five clauses but for the fact that the time limits of the ru

Here, the six month period has long since expired, and the Ricos cannot extend the limitations period by recasting their Rule 11 allegations as violations of Rule 60(c)(6).2

Law P. 85(C)(1)(f); (stating clause 6 of Rule 60(c) and the rest of the five clauses are mutually 2 Husband filed a notice of appeal after the court denied his motion to reconsider the dismissal.

(reason for granting relief under Rule 60(c)(6) “must not be one of the reasons set forth in the five preceding clauses” because “[c]lause 6 and the first five clauses are mutually exclusive”); cf. Amanti Elec., Inc. v. Engineered Structures, Inc., ¶ 10

(quoting Rodgers v. Watt, 722 F.2d 456, 459 (9th Cir.1983); , ); ¶ 19 , (recognizing the strong public policy favoring the finality of judgments); , (noting that the six-month limit of Rule 60(c)(i)-(3) "was designed to ensure the finality of judgments”).