Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Ryan v. State, 656 P.2d 597.

140 citing documents.

Fidelity Security Life Insurance v. State 954 P.2d 580 Ariz. 1998
( , ); Stone v. Arizona Highway Comm’n
Diaz v. Magma Copper Co. 950 P.2d 1165 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1997
Diaz v. Magma Copper Co. 950 P.2d 1165 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1997
b. Determination of Governmental Policy The State also argues that the inspection of mines is immune from liability because it involves “the determination of fundamental governmental policy.” , the “ad hoc approach” -11 , -600 (1982), 7 is still used to evaluate whether an administrative function involves fundamental governmental policy.
Fidelty Security Life Insurance v. State 935 P.2d 861 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
Fidelty Security Life Insurance v. State 935 P.2d 861 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
Madden-Tyler v. Maricopa County 943 P.2d 822 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
Sanchez v. City of Tucson 943 P.2d 789 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1997
Sanchez v. City of Tucson 943 P.2d 789 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1997
Standard Chartered PLC v. Price Waterhouse 945 P.2d 317 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
Standard Chartered PLC v. Price Waterhouse 945 P.2d 317 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
Hutcherson v. City of Phoenix 933 P.2d 1251 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
Overruled Hutcherson v. City of Phoenix 933 P.2d 1251 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
(“[W]e conclude that the doctrine in Massengill should be abandoned and that case is overruled.”).
Warrington v. Tempe Elementary School District No. 3 928 P.2d 673 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
Warrington v. Tempe Elementary School District No. 3 928 P.2d 673 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
In 1982 the supreme court reaffirmed Arizona’s public policy that “ “where negligence is the proximate cause of injury, the rule is liability and immunity is the exception.’ ” , (quoting Stone, 93 Ariz. at 392 , 381 P.2d at 112 ).
Galati v. Lake Havasu City 920 P.2d 11 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
Galati v. Lake Havasu City 920 P.2d 11 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
Adams v. State 916 P.2d 1156 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1995
Adams v. State 916 P.2d 1156 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1995
Goss v. City of Globe 883 P.2d 466 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1994
Goss v. City of Globe 883 P.2d 466 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1994
Lakritz v. Superior Court 880 P.2d 1144 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
Lakritz v. Superior Court 880 P.2d 1144 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
Carroll v. Robinson 874 P.2d 1010 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
Carroll v. Robinson 874 P.2d 1010 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
Evenstad v. State 875 P.2d 811 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
Evenstad v. State 875 P.2d 811 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
the Arizona Supreme Court wrestled with the issue of proper limits on the immunity of public entities: We deem an ad hoc approach to be most appropriate for the further development of the law in the field.
Sanchez v. Coxon 854 P.2d 126 Ariz. 1993
Sanchez v. Coxon 854 P.2d 126 Ariz. 1993
Tucson Unified School District v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. 849 P.2d 790 Ariz. 1993
Tucson Unified School District v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. 849 P.2d 790 Ariz. 1993
(“[T]he explicit language of [section 12-510 shows that] the state itself is always and under all circumstances exempt from statutes of lim-itations____”); , modified by 1984 Ariz. Session Laws ch. 285 § 3 (codified at A.R.S.
Tucson Electric Power Co. v. Arizona Department of Revenue 851 P.2d 132 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
Tucson Electric Power Co. v. Arizona Department of Revenue 851 P.2d 132 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
the court reaffirmed its decision in Stone v. Arizona Highway Comm’n, , severely limiting the common law defense of governmental tort immunity, and held that immunity is a defense “only when its application is necessary to avoid a severe hampering or thwarting o
Pima County v. State 850 P.2d 115 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
Pima County v. State 850 P.2d 115 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
rejected global sovereign immunity in preference for the restricted immunity enshrined in A.R.S.
Bird v. State Through Corbin 821 P.2d 287 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1991
Bird v. State Through Corbin 821 P.2d 287 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1991
the Arizona Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule that government is subject to tort liability and immunity is the exception
Estate of Aten v. City of Tucson 817 P.2d 951 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1991
Estate of Aten v. City of Tucson 817 P.2d 951 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1991
Newman v. Maricopa County 808 P.2d 1253 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1991
Newman v. Maricopa County 808 P.2d 1253 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1991
stating that it would no longer “engage in the speculative exercise of determining whether the tort-feasor has a general duty to the injured party, which spells no recovery, or if he had a specific individual duty which means recovery.” 134 Ariz. at 310 , 656 P.2d at 599 .
City of Tucson v. Fahringer 795 P.2d 819 Ariz. 1990
City of Tucson v. Fahringer 795 P.2d 819 Ariz. 1990
Legislative History of Act In 1982, , which held that when a government entity or employee is a defendant in a tort action, “the rule is liability and immunity is the exception.”
Pritchard v. State 788 P.2d 1178 Ariz. 1990
Overruled Pritchard v. State 788 P.2d 1178 Ariz. 1990
However, , we overruled *431 Massengill and returned to the basic principles of tort liability in sovereign immunity cases.
Andrew S. Arena, Inc. v. Superior Court 788 P.2d 1174 Ariz. 1990
Andrew S. Arena, Inc. v. Superior Court 788 P.2d 1174 Ariz. 1990
“the rule is liability and [sovereign] immunity is the exception.” , we suggested the propriety of legislative involvement in the handling of claims against governmental entities.
Guibault v. Pima County 778 P.2d 1342 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1989
Guibault v. Pima County 778 P.2d 1342 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1989
Daggett v. County of Maricopa 770 P.2d 384 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1989
Overruled Daggett v. County of Maricopa 770 P.2d 384 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1989
These decisions, however, , , 41 A.L.R.3d 692 (1969), , , 38 A.L.R.4th 1188 (1982) by our supreme court.