Cited by

See, ¶ 9 (2021) (discussing a multi-tenant commercial building premises liability claim); –03 (1983) (deciding what duties a municipality owes to pedestrians on its roads); ¶¶ 1–3 (2000) (deciding whether our comparative fault statute preserves vicarious liability for an independent contractor’s negligence on a roadway).

to satisfy the duty” (quoting W. Prosser & W. Keeton, The Law of Torts § 53 at 356 (5th ed. 1984))); (stating that “the nature [or obvious character] of the obstruction .

On the contrary, it is well-established that the “standard of care imposed upon a municipality is that of an ordinarily prudent [person].” ().

But “not every defect or obstruction of the sidewalk gives rise to liability.” –04, –20 (1983).

See, Ariz. State Highway Dep’t v. Bechtold, City of Phoenix.

-04 , -20 (1983) (rejecting the theory that the “open and obvious nature of the condition” ends the defendant’s duty to the plaintiff and stating that such conditions are relevant to both defendant’s negligence and plaintiff’s contributory negligence).

"[T]he State has a duty to keep its highways reasonably safe for travel.” , ( , ).

(stating defendant city owed a duty to “keep its streets and sidewalks reasonably safe for travel by the public”) (internal citation omitted); Coburn, 143 Ariz. at 52 , 691 P.2d at 1080 (stating that a municipality is “under an obligation for the benefit of those who use the public st

ant summary judgment for defendant on theory that plaintiff’s later negligent disregard of danger was sole proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury); see also Schwab, 164 Ariz. at 423-24, 793 P.2d at 1090-91 (under art. XVIII, § 5 legislature cannot enact statute making conduct of injured person bar to recovery against one whose negligent conduct was a cause of injury); P.2d 801 (App. 1997) (plaintiff’s failure to look before entering street raises defense of contributory negligence; issue cannot b

¶4 While the question of duty is generally answered by the court as a matter of law, , there may be preliminary fact issues that a jury must resolve.

The Issue ¶ 8 In deciding this ease, we bear in mind that in negligence cases, “the rule is uniformly applied that where different inferences can be drawn from uncontroverted facts the case must be left to the jury.” , (footnote omitted).

m which the fact-finder could reasonably conclude that the public agency or jurisdiction should have foreseen a danger to plaintiff from the negligent or inattentive conduct of plaintiff or of another, then the question of the county’s negligence is one for the jury.” *172 , (citation omitted); , (where it appears from the evidence that reasonable people could differ as to whether injury is foreseeable, the question of negligence is one of fact for a jury).

“ ‘The standard of care imposed upon a municipality is that of an ordinarily prudent man.’ ” , ( , 237 P. 168, 172 (1925)).

(open and obvious condition did not end defendant’s duty of care but, instead, was relevant to question of negligence).

Markowitz, 146 Ariz. at 354 , 706 P.2d at 366