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This case requires us to consider whether that “anti- abrogation clause” extends to rights of action created after our constitution was ratified, and more specifically, which imposed tort liability upon liquor licensees that cause harm by overserving their patrons.

(defining superseding cause as "an intervening act of another [that] was unforeseeable by a reasonable person in the position of the original actor" and that "appears extraordinary" to one "looking backward, after the event").

Duty is an “obligation, recognized by law, requiring the [defendant] to conform to a certain standard of conduct, for the protection of others against unreasonable risks.” (quoting William Prosser, Handbook on the Law of Torts § 30, at 143 (4th ed. 1971)).

5 AVITIA v. CRISIS PREPARATION, et al. Opinion of the Court Ariz. 560, 563-64, ¶ 7 (2018); (citing William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 30, at 143 (4th ed. 1971); ).

Inc. v. Edais Eng’g Inc., ¶ 17 (2022) (noting “‘we exercise great restraint in declaring public policy’ in the absence of legislative guidance” (quoting Quiroz v. ALCOA, Inc., ¶ 19 (2018))); (stating that the common law is “judge-made and judge- applied” and changes as public policy changes).

a tavern owner [wa]s not liable for injuries sustained off-premises by third persons as the result of the acts of an intoxicated patron, even though the tavern owner’s negligence in serving that patron was a contributing cause of the accident.” (citing Cruse v. Aden, 20 N.E.

Thus, an intervening event is a “later cause of independent origin.” –06 (1983) (emphasis added) (quoting William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 44 (4th ed. 1971)); see also Torres, 252 Ariz. at 31 ¶ 12 (“An intervening cause is an independent cause that occurs between a defendant’s .

(“[T]he common law, which is judge-made and judge-applied, can and will be changed when changed conditions and circumstances establish that it is unjust or has become bad public policy.

¶12 Actual cause exists when the defendant’s conduct contributes to a plaintiff’s injuries, which “would not have occurred but for defendant’s conduct.” (internal quotations omitted).

Hosp., Inc., (applying an increased risk of harm causation standard); (noting “there is liability if the result would not have occurred but for defendant’s conduct, even if that conduct contributed only a little to plaintiff’s injuries”); (applying a “substantial factor” causation standard); A Tumbling-T Ranches v. Paloma Inv.

¶ 9 (2007); (citing William L. Prosser, Handbook on the Law of Torts § 30, at 143 (4th ed. 1971); ).

Actual causation “exists if the defendant’s act helped cause the final result and if that result would not have happened without the defendant’s act.”

(causation element of negligence claim requires “[a] reasonably close causal connection between the conduct and the resulting injury.”).

–06 (1983); Patterson, 214 Ariz. at 438–39 ¶¶ 13–14; ¶ 11 (App. 2004).

See, ¶ 7 (2015) ("'[D]uty' is 'an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.'") ( (quoting William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 42, at 325-26 (4th ed. 1971))); Gipson, 214 Ariz. at 145-46, ¶¶ 18-26.

Gipson, 214 Ariz. at 143 ¶ 9

that defendant is not relieved of liability” ()); United States v. Pineda-Doval, 614 F.3d 1019, 1028-29 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding “[p]roximate cause is drawn more broadly when the intervening action was not a coincidence or unrelated to the defendant’s prior conduct, but rather was a response to that conduct .

at 94 ¶ 19 (footnote omitted) ().

¶14 Appellants also point to Ontiveros v. Borak, where our supreme court stated in dicta that “every person is under a duty to avoid creating situations which pose an unreasonable risk of harm to others.”

¶26 Contrary to Appellants’ argument, , quoted in Nunez v. Professional Transit Mgmt.

As a general rule, “every person is under a duty to avoid creating situations which pose an unreasonable risk of harm to others.” accord Nunez v. Prof’l Transit Mgmt.

¶ 13 Second, , does not show that Arizona adopted the standard later reflected in Restatement Third § 7(a).