Cited by

(citing William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 30, at 143 (4th ed.1971))

Additionally, even if this Court were to determine that it was reasonably foreseeable that she would return to the bar, her independent action, without aid or assistance of the Defendant, would be a superceding intervening cause, and a recovery would be precluded under [ , ].

(citing William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 30, at 143 (4th ed.1971)).

But, a superseding cause relieves an original tortfeasor of liability only when “an intervening act of another was unforeseeable by a reasonable person in the position of the original actor and when, looking backward, 10 after the event, the intervening act appears extraordinary.” Ontiveros v. Borak, 136 Ariz. 500, 506

¶20 Duty is “‘an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that a particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.’” quoting William L. Prosser, Handbook on the Law of Torts § 42, at 324-27 (4th ed. 1971).

See, ( P.2d 479 (1966), regarding “use of the ‘moral quality’ prong of [test] to determine whether one charged with a misdemeanor criminal offense is entitled to trial by jury”); Ontiveros v. Borak, 136 Ariz. 500, (abolishing common law rule of nonliability for tavern owners for accidents caused by intoxicated patrons); (holding that “the mere presence of the owner in an automobile driven by another does not create any presumption of a mast

Although we acknowledge that the public interest can sometimes require special rules to protect certain entities from ordinary theories of tort liability, we must also consider that “special rules of nonliability and immunity lead to the encouragement of irresponsibility and consequent harm to society.” (despite legislative silence, overruling common-law rule protecting tavern owners from liability for the acts of intoxicated customers), superseded by A.R.S.

at 201 ¶ 17, 8 P.3d at 389 ( , ).

“Duty” essentially is “ ‘an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.’” , quoting W. Prosser, Handbook on the Law of Torts § 42, at 324-27 (4th ed.1971).

Serrano v. Kenneth A. Ethridge Contracting Co., 2 Ariz.App.

See Cronin, , Wagenseller, 147 Ariz. at 376-81 , 710 P.2d at 1031-36 ; -56 , -44 (1988)

¶ 12 Duty is a “ ‘question of whether the defendant is under any obligation for the benefit of a particular plaintiff.’” , quoting William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 53, at 324 (4th ed.1971).

¶3 , tavern owners or “dram shops” were not subject to liability for off-premises injuries resulting from the acts of an intoxicated patron.

¶ 17 Duty is, after all, merely “an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.”

See Wagenseller, 147 Ariz. at 378 , 710 P.2d at 1033 ; , (courts make public policy, though “subject to legislative correction”).

¶ 19 Plaintiffs’ next argument goes as follows: Arizona had a pre-statehood common law rule of tavern owner nonliability for furnishing liquor to intoxicated persons; -08 , -08 (1983), abolished that rule and recognized a negligence cause of action against tavern owners for furnishing liquor to intoxicated persons; the legislature enacted a statute that abrogated part of that cause of action; , he