Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Barrio v. San Manuel Division Hospital for Magma Copper Co., 692 P.2d 280.

129 citing documents.

Duncan v. Scottsdale Medical Imaging, Ltd. 70 P.3d 435 Ariz. 2003
Duncan v. Scottsdale Medical Imaging, Ltd. 70 P.3d 435 Ariz. 2003
for Magma Copper Co., (statute that required a minor who was injured before reaching the age of seven to sue for such injuries before reaching the age of ten did not allow the minor a reasonable choice of alternatives); Ruth v. Indus.
Sun Health Corp. v. Myers 70 P.3d 444 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
Sun Health Corp. v. Myers 70 P.3d 444 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
at 399, 742 P.2d at 1385 (emphasis in original) ( , ).
State v. Hickman 68 P.3d 418 Ariz. 2003
State v. Hickman 68 P.3d 418 Ariz. 2003
In Re Leon G. 59 P.3d 779 Ariz. 2002
In Re Leon G. 59 P.3d 779 Ariz. 2002
Porter v. Triad of Arizona (L.P.) 52 P.3d 799 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
Porter v. Triad of Arizona (L.P.) 52 P.3d 799 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
To the contrary, Arizona has long recognized that the minority tolling statute “appl[ies] to all other actions and claims of minors, [including] medical malpractice actions.”
Flood Control Dist. v. Gaines 43 P.3d 196 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
Flood Control Dist. v. Gaines 43 P.3d 196 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
¶ 11 -07 , -86 (1984), the court found unconstitutional a special statute of limitations that required a minor injured when below the age of seven to bring the action by age ten because it "abrogated" rather than "regulated" the action in violation of Article 18, Section 6 of the Arizona Constitution (
Calnimptewa v. Flagstaff Police Department 30 P.3d 634 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
Calnimptewa v. Flagstaff Police Department 30 P.3d 634 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
Appellees nevertheless argue that the Luchanski court could have considered whether the arrestee was in custody because appellate courts can decide issues not presented at the trial level if they are of statewide importance
REPUBLIC NAT. BANK OF NY v. Pima County 25 P.3d 1 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2001
REPUBLIC NAT. BANK OF NY v. Pima County 25 P.3d 1 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2001
Clouse Ex Rel. Clouse v. State 16 P.3d 757 Ariz. 2001
Clouse v. State 11 P.3d 1012 Ariz. 2000
Cronin v. Sheldon 991 P.2d 231 Ariz. 1999
Cronin v. Sheldon 991 P.2d 231 Ariz. 1999
State v. Arizona Property & Casualty Insurance Guaranty Fund 966 P.2d 557 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
State v. AZ. PROPERTY & CAS. INS. 966 P.2d 557 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
State v. AZ. PROPERTY & CAS. INS. 966 P.2d 557 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
State v. Arizona Property & Casualty Insurance Guaranty Fund 966 P.2d 557 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
Ramirez v. Health Partners 972 P.2d 658 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1998
Ramirez v. Health Partners 972 P.2d 658 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1998
“which made it possible to enforce in court a claim for personal injury or death without the necessity of overcoming practically insurmountable defenses.” , (citation omitted), quoting Indus.
AA MECHANICAL v. Superior Court 948 P.2d 492 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
Dugan v. Fujitsu Business Communications Systems, Inc. 937 P.2d 706 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
Dugan v. Fujitsu Business Communications Systems, Inc. 937 P.2d 706 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
Kiley v. Jennings, Strouss & Salmon 927 P.2d 796 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
Kiley v. Jennings, Strouss & Salmon 927 P.2d 796 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
However, we disagree with the trial court’s , has no bearing on these facts.
Little v. ALL PHOENIX S. COM. MENT. HLTH. 919 P.2d 1368 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1996
Little v. ALL PHOENIX S. COM. MENT. HLTH. 919 P.2d 1368 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1996
1954 , 95 L.Ed.2d 527 (1987)
Little v. All Phoenix South Community Mental Health Center, Inc. 919 P.2d 1368 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1995
Little v. All Phoenix South Community Mental Health Center, Inc. 919 P.2d 1368 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1995
1954 , 95 L.Ed.2d 527 (1987)
Jimenez v. Sears, Roebuck and Co. 904 P.2d 861 Ariz. 1995
Jimenez v. Sears, Roebuck and Co. 904 P.2d 861 Ariz. 1995
(invalidating special statute of limitation for minor plaintiffs in medical malpractice actions because it did not provide plaintiff with a reasonable election of remedies).
Young Through Young v. Dfw Corp. 908 P.2d 1 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1995
Young Through Young v. Dfw Corp. 908 P.2d 1 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1995
Ward v. State 871 P.2d 711 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
Ward v. State 871 P.2d 711 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
(quoting Barrio v. San Manuel Div. Hospital, Magma Copper Co., , ).
Hazine v. Montgomery Elevator Co. 861 P.2d 625 Ariz. 1993
Hazine v. Montgomery Elevator Co. 861 P.2d 625 Ariz. 1993
Resolution Trust Corp. v. Foust 869 P.2d 183 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
Resolution Trust Corp. v. Foust 869 P.2d 183 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
Church v. Rawson Drug & Sundry Co. 842 P.2d 1355 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
Church v. Rawson Drug & Sundry Co. 842 P.2d 1355 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
However, “[the legislature] may not, under the guise of ‘regulation,’ so affect the fundamental right to sue for damages as to effectively deprive the claimant of the ability to bring the action.” , (statute of limitation which required minor injured when below the age of seven to bring a medical malpractice action by age ten— regardless of ability to do so or nature of child’s caretakers—held unconstitutional).
Aldrich and Steinberger v. Martin 837 P.2d 1180 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1992
Aldrich and Steinberger v. Martin 837 P.2d 1180 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1992
That discretion is appropriately exercised only in cases in which a constitutional issue is raised, , the question is one of statewide public importance, , there is clearly a wrong to be redressed, Bohonus v. Am *448 erco, , or the unraised issue will dispose of the case on appeal and avoid the futility of retu
Dietz v. General Electric Co. 821 P.2d 166 Ariz. 1991