Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Oshrin v. Coulter, 688 P.2d 1001.

61 citing documents.

R.S./s.E. v. Hon. thompson/teddy Vanders 485 P.3d 1068 Ariz. 2021
R.S./s.E. v. Hon. thompson/teddy Vanders 485 P.3d 1068 Ariz. 2021
¶14 “[T]he denial of due process is a denial of fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice,” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted), and our ultimate goal is to further the truth-seeking function of judicial proceedings, see Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 414–15 (1988); Chambers, 410 U.S. at 295.
State v. Hon. cooper/chambers III Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
State v. Hon. cooper/chambers III Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
¶8 “Due process requires that a defendant receive a fundamentally fair trial, including ‘a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’” R.S., 247 Ariz. at 579, ¶ 14 (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984), ).
rs/se v. Hon. thompson/vanders Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
rs/se v. Hon. thompson/vanders Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
¶14 Due process requires that a defendant receive a fundamentally fair trial, including “a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.” California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)
Villalpando v. Reagan 121 P.3d 172 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
Villalpando v. Reagan 121 P.3d 172 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
4 A defendant does not state a claim for a violation of his due-process rights, however, unless the conflict is so severe as to deprive him of fundamental fairness in a manner “shocking to the universal sense of justice.” , (quoting Crouch v. Justice of Peace Court, 7 Ariz.App.
State v. Rosengren 14 P.3d 303 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2000
State v. Rosengren 14 P.3d 303 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2000
MacK v. Cruikshank 2 P.3d 100 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1999
MacK v. Cruikshank 2 P.3d 100 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1999
(suppression of test results and dismissal of (A)(2) charge constituted proper sanctions for due process violation in telling defendant charges had been dropped, so he did not have sample tested, and then refiling charges months later); , (197
State v. Sanchez 967 P.2d 129 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1998
State v. Sanchez 967 P.2d 129 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1998
¶ 8 The state next argues that, even if Sanchez’s due process rights were violated, the proper remedy is suppression of the evidence, not dismissal, , Scales; , Harrison
State v. Bolan 927 P.2d 819 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
State v. Bolan 927 P.2d 819 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
“Generally speaking, the denial of due process is a denial of ‘fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice.’ ” , (quoting Crouch v. Justice of Peace Court, 7 Ariz.App.
Humble v. Superior Court 880 P.2d 629 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
Humble v. Superior Court 880 P.2d 629 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
See, , , overruled on other grounds by Mendoza; , , (court of appeals declined special action jurisdiction but supreme court granted review to reverse and remand to trial court).
State v. Vannoy 866 P.2d 874 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
State v. Vannoy 866 P.2d 874 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
State v. Youngblood 844 P.2d 1152 Ariz. 1993
State v. Melendez 834 P.2d 154 Ariz. 1992
State v. Melendez 834 P.2d 154 Ariz. 1992
(“[T]he denial of due process is a denial of ‘fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice.’”) (quoting Crouch v. Justice of Peace Court of Sixth Precinct, 7 Ariz.App.
State Ex Rel. Romley v. Superior Court 836 P.2d 445 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
State Ex Rel. Romley v. Superior Court 836 P.2d 445 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
State v. Mendoza 823 P.2d 51 Ariz. 1992
State v. Mendoza 823 P.2d 51 Ariz. 1992
In Hinson , , for the proposition that a defendant acts reasonably if he destroys evidence or fails to preserve evidence after being informed that the charges against him have been dropped.
State v. Kemp 813 P.2d 315 Ariz. 1991
State v. Kemp 813 P.2d 315 Ariz. 1991
State v. Velasco 799 P.2d 821 Ariz. 1990
State v. Velasco 799 P.2d 821 Ariz. 1990
As Justice Cameron previously noted: There is probably no more nebulous and indefinable concept in the law than “due process of law.” Generally speaking, the denial of due process is a denial of “fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice.” , (citations omitted).
State Ex Rel. Dean v. City Court 788 P.2d 99 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1990
State Ex Rel. Dean v. City Court 788 P.2d 99 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1990
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES The state contends that it offered the appellees due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution because (1) due process only requires that an arrestee be informed of the choices that allow him to test the state’s evidence at a later date; (2) , (3) replicate breath testing without providing a sample to the arrestee has been upheld by the United States Supreme Court in California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 , 104 S.Ct.
Cornell v. Superior Court, Cochise County 770 P.2d 305 Ariz. 1989
Cornell v. Superior Court, Cochise County 770 P.2d 305 Ariz. 1989
Shepherd v. Fahringer 762 P.2d 553 Ariz. 1988
Shepherd v. Fahringer 762 P.2d 553 Ariz. 1988
Johnson v. Tucson City Court 751 P.2d 600 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1988
Johnson v. Tucson City Court 751 P.2d 600 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1988
State v. White 747 P.2d 613 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1987
State v. White 747 P.2d 613 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1987
Shepherd v. Fahringer 746 P.2d 1324 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1987
Shepherd v. Fahringer 746 P.2d 1324 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1987
See Hinson v. Coulter, supra
State v. Crotty 731 P.2d 629 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1986
Distinguished State v. Crotty 731 P.2d 629 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1986
The issue presented is whether the trial court erred in granting appellee’s
State v. Mance 733 P.2d 298 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1986
State v. Mance 733 P.2d 298 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1986
The *414 trial court granted the motion as to the second count on the ground that the state’s
Hinson v. Coulter 723 P.2d 655 Ariz. 1986
Hinson v. Coulter 723 P.2d 655 Ariz. 1986
Montano v. Superior Court Pima County 719 P.2d 271 Ariz. 1986