Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Edsall v. SUPER. CT. IN & FOR COUNTY OF PIMA, 693 P.2d 895.

62 citing documents.

  • Duran v. Terrones Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
  • Duran v. Terrones Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
    ¶13 “A property award is essentially permanent[.]”
  • In Re the Marriage of Rojas 530 P.3d 1167 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2023
  • In Re the Marriage of Rojas 530 P.3d 1167 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2023
    247-48 (1984) (attorney fees in dissolution action concerning fully merged marital 12 IN RE MARRIAGE OF ROJAS Opinion of the Court settlement agreement controlled by § 25-324 rather than contractual prevailing-party provision
  • Planned Parenthood Arizona, Inc. v. Mark Brnovich Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2022
  • Planned Parenthood Arizona, Inc. v. Mark Brnovich Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2022
    Rule 60(b)(5) permits a court to relieve a party from a final judgment if “it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable.” Rule 60(b)(5) has “been used liberally in reopening otherwise final court orders where there has been a change in the law affecting substantial rights of a litigant.”
  • Aow v. Scythian Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
  • Aow v. Scythian Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
  • Bade v. Powar Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
  • Bade v. Powar Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
    ¶14 To succeed on his aiding and abetting medical battery claim, Bade must prove that Dr. Powar committed a medical battery, that Johnson was aware that Dr. Powar’s conduct breached a duty of care, Polanco v. Indus.
  • Porteous v. Francies Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
  • Porteous v. Francies Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
    § 25-324 are intended to ‘[e]nsure that the poorer party has the proper means to litigate the action.’” Quijada, 246 Ariz. at 222, ¶ 17 (–70 (App. 1983)); see also Edsall v. Superior Court In & For Pima Cty., (noting that § 25-324 was designed to assure the poorer party a remedy).
  • Curtis v. Thomas Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
  • Curtis v. Thomas Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
    –99, ¶¶ 30– 31 (App. 2017) (citing Edsall v. Superior Court In & For Pima Cty., –49 (1984)).
  • Barron v. Barron 440 P.3d 1136 Ariz. 2019
  • Barron v. Barron 440 P.3d 1136 Ariz. 2019
  • Johnson v. Johnson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
  • Johnson v. Johnson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
    Edsall v. Superior Court (Edsall), 2 The change in the law Husband relies upon is the Kelly decision.
  • Barron v. Barron 443 P.3d 977 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
  • Barron v. Barron 443 P.3d 977 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
    § 1408(c)(1) (2018); -42 (1984).
  • Bobrow v. Bobrow 391 P.3d 646 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
  • Bobrow v. Bobrow 391 P.3d 646 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
    ¶27 Alternatively, Wife argues the enforcement of the prevailing-party provision of the Agreement would violate public policy as set forth in Edsall v. Superior Court, 143 Ariz. at 247-49 , .
  • Sandra Howell v. John Howell 361 P.3d 936 Ariz. 2015
  • Sandra Howell v. John Howell 361 P.3d 936 Ariz. 2015
    § 1408(c)(1); –42, –97 (1984) (noting that the USFSPA made MRP subject to Arizona’s community property laws).
  • Shacknai v. Shacknai Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
  • Shacknai v. Shacknai Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
    -49, -04 (1984), superseded in part by statutory amendment to A.R.S.
  • MacLean v. Kappa Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
  • MacLean v. Kappa Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
    After full briefing, the superior court declined to reconsider its denial of a fee award under the statute, the discretionary statutory attorney’s fees provision A.R.S.
  • Davies v. Beres 233 P.3d 1139 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
  • Davies v. Beres 233 P.3d 1139 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
    Van Loan, 116 Ariz. at 273-74 , 569 P.2d at 215-16 .
  • State v. Jackson 113 P.3d 112 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
  • State v. Jackson 113 P.3d 112 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
    Our case law permits the use of Rule 60(c)(6) in " 'extraordinary circumstances of hardship or injustice,' other than or in addition to those circumstances set out in clauses (1) through (5).” , , Edsall v. Superior Court (Edsall)
  • Marriage of Birt v. Birt 96 P.3d 544 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
  • Marriage of Birt v. Birt 96 P.3d 544 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
    ¶ 13 , and Lloyd v. Lloyd, 23 Ariz.App.
  • Stewart v. Travers 965 P.2d 67 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
  • Stewart v. Travers 965 P.2d 67 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
    allows relief from a final judgment for “any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” For this clause to apply, none of the particular reasons set forth in clauses one through five can apply, and the motion must raise “extraordinary circumstances of hardship or injustice.” -87 , -11 (1982); see also Edsall v. Superior Ct.
  • STATE DES v. Valentine 945 P.2d 828 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
  • STATE DES v. Valentine 945 P.2d 828 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
    -87 , -11 (1982); Beal v. State Farm Mut.
  • In Re the Marriage of Gaddis 957 P.2d 1010 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1997
  • In Re the Marriage of Gaddis 957 P.2d 1010 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1997
  • Marriage of LaPrade v. LaPrade 941 P.2d 1268 Ariz. 1997
  • Marriage of LaPrade v. LaPrade 941 P.2d 1268 Ariz. 1997
    Ct., , -38 , -88 (1983).
  • Smith v. Saxon 918 P.2d 1088 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
  • Smith v. Saxon 918 P.2d 1088 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
  • Burnette v. Bender 908 P.2d 1086 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
  • Burnette v. Bender 908 P.2d 1086 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
    “This statute was designed to assure the poorer party a *306 remedy.”
  • Marriage of Flynn v. Rogers 834 P.2d 148 Ariz. 1992
  • Marriage of Flynn v. Rogers 834 P.2d 148 Ariz. 1992
    presented us with our first opportunity to consider an issue involving a decree that had become final during the period between the filing of McCarty and the effective date of the FSPA.
  • Marriage of Gore v. Gore 821 P.2d 254 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1991
  • Marriage of Gore v. Gore 821 P.2d 254 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1991