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Newspapers, Inc., –19 (1986).

Although contradictory dicta can be found in a few of this Court’s cases—namely, Boswell v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., –18 (1986) –44 (1993)—this Court has never extended the anti-abrogation clause to rights of action not recognized at statehood, and we will not do so now.

See Boswell v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc.

Newspapers, Inc., n.4 (App. 1985) (supplement by ).

¶23 In Boswell v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., -18 (1986), our supreme court held that the anti-abrogation clause “extends to wrongs recognized at common law, but it is not limited to those elements and concepts of particular actions which were defined in our pre-statehood case law.” Two years later, however, in Bryant v. Continental Conveyor & Equipment Co., 1

on to recover damages for injuries shall never be abrogated, and the amount recovered shall not be subject to any statutory limitation.” The anti-abrogation clause “was intended to take the right to seek justice out of executive and legislative control, preserving the ability to invoke judicial remedies for those wrongs traditionally recognized at common law.” Boswell v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc.

Under Article 18, Section 6 of the Arizona Constitution, “[t]he right of action to recover damages for injuries shall never be abrogated, and the amount recovered shall not be subject to any statutory limitation.” The provision preserves “the ability to invoke judicial remedies for those wrongs traditionally recognized at common law,” Boswell v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., and protects claims that evolved from common law antecedents.

So do we, and given that the text in question 6 STATE V. PATEL Opinion of the Court does not limit the amount of restitution, we will not “restrict the guarantee by adding words of limitation ‘contrary to the plain language used.’” Boswell v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., (refusing to limit the constitutional right to recover for damages enshrined in Article 18, section 6 of the Arizona Constitution (–20 (1970)).

Newspapers, Inc., (recognizing that a retraction could be considered in mitigation of damages).

Newspapers, Inc., n.4 (App. 1985), approved as supplemented, 5 As previously noted, Kansas does not recognize defamation per se.

As a result, in assessing whether a claim is protected under the anti-abrogation clause, we first must determine whether the right to file a negligence claim was among “those wrongs traditionally recognized at common law” including “the right of people to seek remedy by due course of law for injury to their lands, goods, person, or reputation.” Boswell v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., -18, -95 (1986) (quoting Proposed Constitution of 1891, art. 2, § 15) (internal quotation marks omitted).

on to recover damages for injuries shall never be abrogated, and the amount recovered shall not be subject to any statutory limitation.” The anti-abrogation clause “was intended to take the right to seek justice out of executive and legislative control, preserving the ability to invoke judicial remedies for those wrongs traditionally recognized at common law.” Boswell v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc.

Cos. v. Premier Manufactured Sys., Inc., ¶ 32, (quoting Boswell v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., ).

to any parent [of] a young driver,” and functions as “solely a penalty against wealthy parents.” ¶22 “Just as the common law is court-made law based on the circumstances and conditions of the time, so can the common law be changed by the court when conditions and circumstances change.” Boswell v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 11 n.21, n.21 (1986) ( ); see also Estate of DeSela v. Prescott Unified Sch.

“Habit describes one’s regular response to a repeated specific situation, while character refers to a generalized description of one’s disposition.” Boswell v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., approved as supplemented, P.2d 186 (1986).

"We differentiate between abrogation and regulation by determining whether a purported leg *148 islative regulation leaves those claiming injury a reasonable possibility of obtaining legal redress.” Boswell v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc.

“We differentiate between abrogation and regulation by-determining whether a purported legislative regulation leaves those claiming injury a reasonable possibility of obtaining legal redress.” Boswell v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc.

In addition to Arizona's strong constitutional protections of the right to bring common-law tort claims and to receive full compensation for any damages, , 538-41 ¶¶ 33-51, -41 (1999) (discussing "anti-abrogation" clause, Art. XVIII, § 6, and "non-limitation" clause, Art. II, § 31); Boswell v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., , (holding that Article XVIII, § 6 "protects the right to recover damages for injury to reputation"), we are bound by this pronouncement from the Arizona Supreme Court: One's repu

See Boswell v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., , (“We interpret constitutional provisions by examining the text and, where necessary, history in an attempt to determine the framers’ intent.”) (emphasis added).

“We interpret constitutional provisions by examining the text and, where necessary, history in an attempt to determine the framers’ intent.” ¶ 54, (quoting Boswell v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., (emphasis added)).

at 190 , 908 P.2d at 4 (quoting Boswell v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., , ).