Cited by

(“Circumstantial evidence in this respect is intrinsically no different from testimonial evidence.” (quoting Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954))); ¶¶ 22, 27–28 (2007) (noting sufficient evidence of “knowingly” based on a combination of direct and circumstan

A. ¶24 First, for the judicial preapproval requirement.

See Valenzuela, 194 Ariz. at 407, ¶ 13; (A jury may consider direct and circumstantial evidence equally.); (“Circumstantial evidence is the proof of the existence of some fact from which fact the existence of the thing in issue may be legally and logically inferred.”).

by the court.”) (emphasis added)

(explaining the court could “draw a negative inference” when a father invoked the Fifth Amendment rather than answer questions about his past drug use in a custody proceeding); (“[T]he probative value of direct and circumstantial evidence [is] intrinsically similar; therefore, there is no logically sound reason for drawing a distinction as to the weight to be assigned each.”).

(explaining that “the circumstances must be such that they are at least consistent with a reasonable inference that defendant knew of the existence of the narcotic which was found, before he may be found guilty of ‘possession’”); (direct and circumstantial evidence have intrinsically similar probative value).

We do not distinguish between direct and circumstantial evidence, (), or reweigh the evidence, (collecting cases).

(“A conviction may be sustained on circumstantial evidence alone.”)

(“The substantial evidence required for conviction may be either circumstantial or direct, and the probative value of the evidence is not reduced simply because it is circumstantial.”).

State v. Reynolds , , 150, , 615 (1969), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Harvill , , 391, , 846 (1970) ; see State v. Little , , 300-01

(noting Arizona law makes no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence).

(“[T]he probative value of direct and circumstantial evidence [is] intrinsically similar; therefore, there is no logically sound reason for drawing a distinction as to the weight to be assigned each.”).

(the jury may consider both direct and circumstantial evidence equally in determining its verdict); ¶ 6 (App. 2004) (the jury determines witness credibility and may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence).

(stating the probative value of direct and circumstantial evidence carry the same evidentiary weight).

¶21 “Experienced defense counsel may very well consider it good trial strategy to fail to ask for such an instruction or to object to such an instruction if proposed.”

In State v. Harvill, our supreme court held that “direct and circumstantial evidence are [of] intrinsically similar [probative value]; therefore, there is no logically sound reason for drawing a distinction as to the weight to be assigned each.”

See *54 , ( , ); , (finding that our supreme court has ruled that since direct and circumstantial evidence have the same probative value, circumstantial evidence need not exclude every other reasonable hypothesis, and that dra

§ 13-1001; State v. Harvill, 106 Ariz. 386, 388, ( P.2d 682 (1963)).

But Arizona has long recognized “that direct and circumstantial evidence have equal probative worth”; and our supreme court has long “abandoned the rule that each link in a chain of circumstantial inference must exclude every other reasonable hypothesis.” , (citing, inter alia, , Andrews v. Fry’s Food Stores, , ).