Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite O'Rielly Motor Company v. Rich, 411 P.2d 194.

44 citing documents.

  • Pusd 210 v. Hon. sinclair/lucero Ariz. 2025
  • Pusd 210 v. Hon. sinclair/lucero Ariz. 2025
    In O’ 26 (1966), a car dealer owed a duty to a customer to provide him a suitable exit after the customer was accidentally locked inside a car dealership and was injured after jumping from an exterior fence to escape.
  • Rachelle Renee Westerman, Paul Bryan Westerman v. Timothy E. Ernst 563 P.3d 647 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2025
  • Rachelle Renee Westerman, Paul Bryan Westerman v. Timothy E. Ernst 563 P.3d 647 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2025
    “This duty includes an obligation ‘to provide reasonably safe means of ingress and egress.’” Stephens v. Bashas’ Inc., (quoting O’).
  • Labarge v. Abdullahi Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2023
  • Labarge v. Abdullahi Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2023
    “We will not interfere in matters within [the court’s] discretion unless we are persuaded that the exercise of such discretion resulted in a miscarriage of justice or deprived one of the litigants of a fair trial.” O’
  • Carberry v. Ward Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
  • Carberry v. Ward Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
    “We will not interfere in matters within [the court’s] discretion unless we are persuaded that the exercise of such discretion resulted in a miscarriage of justice or deprived one of the litigants of a fair trial.” O’
  • Bekele v. Abreha Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
  • Bekele v. Abreha Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
    “We will not interfere in matters within [the court’s] discretion unless we are persuaded that the exercise of such discretion resulted in a miscarriage of justice or deprived one of the litigants of a fair trial.” O’
  • Hinton v. Hinton Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
  • Hinton v. Hinton Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
  • Day v. Armendt Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
  • Day v. Armendt Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
    “We will not interfere in matters within [the trial court’s] discretion unless we are persuaded that the exercise of such discretion resulted in a miscarriage of justice or deprived one of the litigants of a fair trial.” O’
  • Brenda D. v. Department of Child Safety 393 P.3d 930 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
  • Brenda D. v. Department of Child Safety 393 P.3d 930 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
    See Christy A., 217 Ariz. at 308, ¶ 81 , (the superior court abuses its discretion when “the exercise of such discretion result[s] in a miscarriage of justice or deprive[s] one of the litigants of a fair trial”) (quoting O’ , ).
  • Wickham v. Hopkins 250 P.3d 245 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
  • Wickham v. Hopkins 250 P.3d 245 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
    ¶ 18 Contending the Hopkinses owed a duty to provide him a reasonably safe means of ingress and egress to and from the premises, Wickham cites several cases including Nicoletti, , , Stephens v. Bashas’ Inc., , and O’
  • Christy A. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security 173 P.3d 463 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
  • Christy A. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security 173 P.3d 463 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
    ‘We will not interfere in matters within [the trial court’s] discretion unless we are persuaded that the exercise of such discretion resulted in a miscarriage of justice or deprived one of the litigants of a fair trial.” O’
  • Stephens v. Bashas' Inc. 924 P.2d 117 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
  • Stephens v. Bashas' Inc. 924 P.2d 117 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
    This duty includes an obligation “to provide reasonably safe means of ingress and egress.” O’
  • Bledsoe v. Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n 880 P.2d 689 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1994
  • Bledsoe v. Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n 880 P.2d 689 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1994
  • Porterie v. Peters 532 P.2d 514 Ariz. 1975
  • Porterie v. Peters 532 P.2d 514 Ariz. 1975
  • City of Scottsdale v. Kokaska 495 P.2d 1327 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1972
  • City of Scottsdale v. Kokaska 495 P.2d 1327 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1972
    398 , where the court said that foreseeability blends into the negligence and proximate cause issues, but primarily is a question of duty; O’ , where the court .said," .
  • Walker v. McClanahan 494 P.2d 725 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1972
  • Walker v. McClanahan 494 P.2d 725 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1972
  • State Ex Rel. Herman v. Mestas 469 P.2d 855 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1970
  • State Ex Rel. Herman v. Mestas 469 P.2d 855 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1970
  • Hing v. Youtsey 460 P.2d 646 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1969
  • Hing v. Youtsey 460 P.2d 646 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1969
    the court refused to abide the Botta rule saying “[T]he preferable rule in this state, in view of our statute and the custom and practice thereunder, is to leave the propriety of counsel’s use of such argument to the sound discretion of the trial court.” We agree that the better rule is that such a matter is properly left to the sound discretion of the trial court, O’ , and we find no abuse of discretion here.
  • Kovrig v. Vasquez 456 P.2d 947 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1969
  • Kovrig v. Vasquez 456 P.2d 947 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1969
    Arnold v. Frigid Food Express Company, supra; O’
  • City of Tucson v. LaForge 446 P.2d 692 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1968
  • City of Tucson v. LaForge 446 P.2d 692 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1968
  • State v. McCormick 442 P.2d 134 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1968
  • State v. McCormick 442 P.2d 134 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1968
    The trial court was not required to reword the instruction, O’ , *586 and the trial court adequately instructed the jury that neither party was required to call as witnesses all persons who were either present at or who might have had knowledge of the matters involved in the trial.
  • Myers v. Rollette 429 P.2d 677 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1967
  • Myers v. Rollette 429 P.2d 677 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1967
    504 , 367 S.W.2d 111 (1963); and O’
  • Moore v. Gray 414 P.2d 158 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1966
  • Moore v. Gray 414 P.2d 158 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1966