Cited by

“[A]n objection on one ground does not preserve the issue [for appeal] on another ground.” ¶ 4 (App. 2008).

¶ 12 (2018); ¶ 4 (App. 2008) (“[A]n objection on one ground does not preserve the issue on another ground.”).

¶ 4 (App. 2008) (“[A]n objection on one ground does not preserve the issue on another ground.

¶19 Tupa did not raise any constitutional objections at trial to the controverted testimony, ¶ 4 (App. 2008) (“An objection on one ground does not preserve the issue on another ground.”), and does not develop any argument how the purported wrongful testimony violated his due process rights, ¶ 91 (2019) (failure to develop due process argument constitutes waiver).

¶9 Although the nurse also engaged in some evidence collection, “statements relevant to diagnosis or treatment can be admissible even when the recipient of the statements engages in the dual purposes of medical examination and evidence collection.” ¶ 15 (App. 2008).

child support.”); n.4 (App. 2008) (within appellate court’s discretion to address issues raised for first time in reply brief).

Moody, 208 Ariz. at 455 ¶ 120; ¶ 4 (App. 2008) (“[A] general objection is insufficient to preserve an issue for appeal.”).

¶ 17 n.4 (App. 2008) (noting that arguments not raised in opening brief generally are waived).

Because Defendant failed to object on these specific grounds, review is “solely for fundamental error.” ¶ 4 (App. 2008).

¶ 4 (App. 2008) (“[A]n objection on one ground does not preserve the issue on another ground.”).

¶ 12 (2002) (doctrine of waiver is discretionary); ¶ 17 n.4 (App. 2008) (same); –66, ¶ 20 (2014) (conducting harmless-error review despite State’s failure to argue error was harmless in brief).

¶ 192 (2016); ¶ 4 (App. 2008) (“[A]n objection on one ground does not preserve the issue on another ground.”).

In determining whether a hearsay statement is “reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment[,]” courts consider “whether the declarant’s apparent motive [is] consistent with receiving medical care[] and [] whether it [is] reasonable for the physician to rely on the information in diagnosis or treatment.” ¶ 8 (App. 2008).

“[A]n objection on one ground does not preserve the issue on another ground.” ¶ 4 (App. 2008).

We review for fundamental error, -35, ¶ 4 (App. 2008), and find none.

When applying the test, “the focus is on the statement, not its recipient.” ¶ 11 (App. 2008).

he DUI investigation because “he knew his level of impairment,” cooperation “would not exonerate him” but “it would convict him,” and sobriety testing “wouldn’t work in his favor.” ¶ 179 (2004) (finding a failure to make a contemporaneous objection to prosecutor’s comments limited court’s review “to one for fundamental error only”); -35, ¶ 4 (App. 2008) (explaining to preserve an issue for appeal, a party must make a timely objection, stating the specific ground of the objection to give the cour

See State v. Hughes, 3 STATE v. DOMPKOWSKI Decision of the Court ¶ 58 (1998); ¶ 4 (App. 2008) (“[A]n objection on one ground does not preserve the issue on another ground.

Although our appellate courts may choose to address issues the parties fail to address in the briefs, ¶ 17 n.4 (App. 2008), they should heed the principles underlying the waiver doctrine intended “to prevent the court from deciding cases with no research assistance or analytical input from the parties,” Meiners v. Indus.

103(a)(1); ¶ 4 (App. 2008).