Cited by

See Yug, 252 Ariz. at 205, ¶ 4 (“The court’s sentencing authority originates from ‘legislative mandates regarding sentencing, and discretion may be exercised only within the parameters determined by the legislature.’”) (citation omitted); ¶ 9 (App. 2009) (“[The court] must proceed in the manner and upon the conditions imposed by the law.”); (“The sentencing court has no discretion to substitute its own judgment for that of the legislature.”).

¶ 10 (App. 2009) (“The test of jurisdiction is whether the tribunal has power to enter upon the inquiry[,] not whether its conclusion in the course of it is right or wrong.” (cleaned up)).

§ 12– 123(A); ¶ 7 (App. 2009).

But “[w]e review de novo issues concerning the meaning and scope of statutes, attempting to discern and fulfill legislative intent.” ¶ 16 (App. 2009).

In our discretion, and because courts should decide cases on non-constitutional grounds when possible, ¶ 14 (App. 2009), we accept jurisdiction over the superior court’s rulings on both motions.

the tribunal has power to enter upon the inquiry; not whether its conclusion in the course of it is right or wrong.” ¶ 10 (App. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted) ().

Second, even if we were to find that issues related to the court’s suppression findings were waived, “[w]e have discretion to address a significant, albeit waived, issue.” ¶ 7, n.2 (App. 2010); ¶ 47, n.8 (App. 2009) (“If application of a legal principle, even if not raised below, would dispose of an action on appeal and correctly explain the law, it is appropriate for us to consider the issue.”) ().

§ 12-123(A); ¶ 6 (App. 2009) (noting subject-matter jurisdiction is power to hear and determine cases of general class to which particular proceedings belong).

¶ 6 Relying on State v. Payne , , Ayonayon first argues the bench warrant fee is illegal as it constitutes a fine for a criminal conviction for violation of a state statute and does not fall within the body of criminal fines established by the state legislature for felonies.

13, 1998), https://www.azleg.gov/legtext/43leg/2r/summary/s.1116.jud.htm; n.5, ¶ 25 (App. 2009) ("Arizona courts have cited Senate fact sheets as relevant legislative history and as reflective, though not dispositive, of legislative intent.").

n.8, ¶ 47 (App. 2009) (“‘If application of a legal principle, even if not raised below, would dispose 3 STATE v. MALIN Decision of the Court of an action on appeal and correctly explain the law, it is appropriate f

Section 13-2314.04(D)(6) allows RICO plaintiffs to recover the proceeds of unlawful activity unless the proceeds are in the hands of a bona 7 n.5, ¶ 25, n.5 (App. 2009) (“Senate fact sheets” are “relevant legislative history .

See, , 563 n. 5, ¶ 25, , 1139 n. 5 (App.2009) (“Senate fact sheets” are “relevant legislative history and ...

554 ¶ 7 n. 2, , 918 n. 2 (App.2010) (providing that although appellate courts generally will not address issues not raised before the trial court, we may address waived issues to uphold a trial court’s ruling); , 569 n. 8, , 1145 n. 8 (App.2009) (“If application of a legal principle, even if not raised before the trial court, would dispose of an action on appeal and correctly explain the law, it is appropriate for us to consider the issue.”).

-68, ¶¶35, 46 , -42 (2009).

§§ 11-584(C) (assessments, fees, and costs for defendants receiving appointed counsel), 12-116(A) (time payment fee), 12-116.01 (surcharges), 12- 116.02 (surcharges), 13-801 (fines), 16-954(A) (surcharge); ¶¶ 31-32, - 41 (App. 2009) (noting different purposes of punitive fines and compensatory assessments and fees, but recognizing “shades of gray” among categories).

at 541-42, 747 P.2d at 1240-41 ; ¶ 33 , (prosecution fee is subject to A.R.S.

¶¶ 11, 20, 921 (App. 2010) (deciding attenuation issue as matter of law even though not presented to trial court); n.8, 1145 n.8 (App. 2009) (“‘If application of a legal principle, even if not raised below, would dispose of an action on appeal and correctly explain the law, it is appropriate for us to consider the issue.’”)

(test of jurisdiction whether tribunal has power to enter upon inquiry, not whether conclusion of inquiry correct).

-69, ¶¶ 47-49 , -45 (App.2009)(trial court had no power to order defendant to pay statutorily unauthorized prosecution fee and that portion of sentence invalid); -28, ¶¶ 10-11 , -84 (App.2004)(if trial court exceeds statutory authority in s

And “comments of individual legislators ‘are not necessarily determinative of legislative intent.’ ” n. 4 , , 1139 n. 4 (App.2009), quoting Stein v. Sonus USA, Inc.

(Ariz. 2004); n.5, n.5 (App. 2009) (legislative fact sheets relevant legislative history and reflective of legislative intent).

("[W]aiver is a procedural concept that courts do not rigidly employ in mechanical fashion.”); , (appellate court may address argument otherwise waived); n. 8 , , 1145 n. 8 (App.2009) ('“If application of a legal principle, even if not raised below, would dispose of an action on appeal and correctly explain the law, it is appropriate for us to consider the issue.’ ”), , cf. State

“But, if ‘the statute’s language is not clear, we determine legislative intent by reading the statute as a whole, giving meaningful operation to all of its provisions, and by considering factors such as the statute’s context, subject matter, historical background, effects and consequences, and spirit and purpose.’ ” ¶ 16 , ( , ).